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Abstract 
Previous studies have reported correlations between the EEGs of  
two spatially  separated  subjects.  These  correlations  could not  be  
explained  by  means  of  conventional  physiological  or  physical  
mechanisms. Results by Wackermann (2003, 2004; Wackermann et  
al, 2004) suggest such unexplained correlations, with the direction  
(increase  or  decrease  of  EEG power)  as  well  as  the  localization  
(electrode position) of the supposed effects varying between studies.  
The present replication study, performed in another laboratory, yet  
other experimental changes kept at a minimum, aimed at clarifying  
this effect. Seventeen pairs of subjects were examined. One subject  
of  each  pair  was  visually  stimulated  by  one-second  periods  of  
checkerboard reversals while the other sat in a dimly lit separate  
room without stimulation. The latter subject’s EEG power in the  
paired  subject’s  stimulation  and  interstimulus  periods  was  
compared; separate analyses were performed for two different time 
windows.  In this study, the previously used mode of EEG segment  
sampling  turned  out  to  systematically  overestimate  effects.  
Therefore,  the  non-parametric  statistical  method  was  modified.  
Also, the results for the nineteen EEG channels were corrected for  
their degrees of freedom using a Monte-Carlo simulation. Results  
did not show a significant deviation from random expectation; the  
EEG power  of  the  non-stimulated  subject  was  not  linked  to  the  
stimulation of the other subject.
Correspondence  details: Wolfgang  Ambach,  Institut  für  Grenzgebiete  der  Psychologie  und 
Psychohygiene, Wilhelmstr. 3A, D-79098 Freiburg, Germany. Email:  ambach@igpp.de
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Introduction
Since 1965, a series of studies have reported correlations between 
the EEGs of spatially separated subjects. In these experiments, pairs of 
subjects were prevented from interacting via known physiological or 
physical  mechanisms;  consequently,  the  findings  have  often  been 
discussed in terms of direct brain-to-brain communication (Charman, 
2006). 
Grinberg-Zylberbaum et  al.  (1994)  coined the term 'transferred 
potentials' for the observation of correlations between the EEGs of two 
spatially separated subjects of whom only one was visually stimulated. 
They found statistical  correlations  between certain  parts  of  the  two 
time series of the averaged event-related EEG segments obtained from 
both subjects. From there on, event-related EEG correlations between 
distant  human  subjects  were  mostly  investigated  on  the  basis  of 
averaged  EEG  segments.  A  critical  analysis  of  the  Grinberg-
Zylberbaum et al. (1994) study has been provided by May et al. (2001). 
They provided evidence for the claim that violations of the underlying 
assumptions  concerning  hypothesis  testing  had  led  to  an 
overestimation  of  the  effects  in  this  study.  Several  subsequent 
experiments  searching  for  EEG  correlations  which  could  not  be 
explained  by  a  known  mechanism,  yielded  positive  results  (e.g. 
Fenwick et al., 1998), while other replication studies (e.g. Sabell et al., 
2001) failed to confirm the effect. Recently, correlations between brain 
electrical  activities  of  distant  human brains  were found by Standish 
(2004) and Radin (2003, 2004).
Two  studies  by  Wackermann  et  al.  (2003,  2004)  aimed  at 
examining  if  correlations  in  the  EEG between a  visually  stimulated 
subject  and  a  second,  non-stimulated  subject  were  replicable  when 
communication between both  participants  was prevented  by  spatial 
separation of subjects in shielded rooms. One subject ('subject A') was 
visually  stimulated  with  repeated  series  of  checkerboard  reversals 
while the other subject ('subject B'), sitting in a dimly lit room, was not 
stimulated. In the control condition, stimulation of the first subject was 
prevented by covering the monitor with an opaque shield. From the 
first to the second study, several methodological refinements had been 
introduced. In both studies, the authors found significant fluctuations 
of  the  EEG  power  of  subject  B  according  to  the  stimulation  or 
interstimulus periods of subject A. Remarkably, the effect of subject A’s 
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stimulation on the EEG power of the non-stimulated subject B varied 
between studies  in  direction (increase,  decrease)  as  well  as  location 
(electrode position). Furthermore, deviations from random expectation 
were not  only observed in the experimental  condition (stimulation), 
but  partially  also  in  the  control  condition  (no  stimulation).  Thus, 
significant  results  were  generally  replicated,  but  not  the  specific 
finding of the direction of the effect or the location of its maximum; 
results of the repeated studies were inconsistent but still striking. 
Our  replication study aimed at  validating the  existence  of  the 
effect and, if possible, shedding light upon its specifications. In relation 
to the preceding studies, it was conducted in a different laboratory and 
guided by a different experimenter. All other experimental conditions 
were kept unchanged as far as possible. The statistical methods applied 
in the precedent studies were reconsidered in detail.
Method
Subjects
Seventeen pairs of related subjects (friends, relatives, or partners;  12 
male, 22 female; age 23.2 ± 1.9 years; mean duration of relationship 4.8 
± 5.3 years) were recruited via announcement in the local students' job 
agency.  They  were  of  reportedly  good  health,  unmedicated,  and 
voluntarily  participated  in  the  study  for  the  payment  of  17  Euros. 
Informed consent was obtained from all subjects.
Stimuli
As visual  stimulus,  a  checkerboard  pattern  with  64  x  48  black  and 
white squares (angular size ≈ 0.25° x 0.25°) was presented on a 19'' LCD 
monitor. The stimulated subject observed the monitor from ≈ 125 cm 
distance (visual angle 16° x 12°). Duration of each stimulation period 
was  one  second,  consisting  of  four  250  ms  periods  with  reversed 
pattern presentations (see Figure 1). 
interstim. int. --- 250 ms    ---    250 ms     ---      250 ms   ---    250 ms --- interstim. int.
Figure 1. Visual stimulation using checkerboard reversals
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168  stimuli  were  presented  within  each  of  the  two  runs  of  the 
experiment  according  to  Wackermann  et  al.  (2004).  Interstimulus 
intervals were 1.5−7.5 seconds; the sequence of intervals was pseudo-
randomized. During interstimulus intervals, the screen was uniformly 
grey  with  the  brightness  adjusted  to  the  overall  brightness  of  the 
checkerboard stimuli.
Physiological Recording
EEG data  were  recorded  from  nineteen  electrodes  according  to  the 
standard  10-20  positions  (Jasper,  1958),  against  linked  mastoids  as 
reference. Impedances were kept below 5 kΩ; Ag-AgCl electrodes were 
attached to the scalp with use of Easy Caps and abrasive gel (both by 
Falk Minow, München, Germany). Vertical and horizontal oculogram 
was recorded for artifact control. Two Synamps amplifiers (NeuroScan, 
Inc.) of the same type were used. EEG was band-pass filtered at 0.15 - 
70 Hz, A/D-converted, sampled at 1000 Hz and saved to disc using the 
software Acquire, Version 4.3.1 (Neurosoft, Inc.).
Procedure
During  the  experiment,  the  subjects  were  seated  in  two  spatially 
separate chambers (distance: 8 meters). The experimental rooms were 
acoustically and electromagnetically shielded and located on different 
sides of the laboratory main room (Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Spatial arrangement of the experimental setup
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Each subject  was  observed  via  a  video-camera  by  one  of  the  two 
experimenters. While one subject of each pair, randomly assigned, was 
stimulated visually in room A, the second was instructed to relax with 
eyes open in the dimly lit room B. The whole experiment consisted of 
two runs,  the  'uncovered'  (experimental)  and the 'covered'  (control) 
condition; the sequence of both was balanced over the study. Between 
both  runs,  the  experimenter  responsible  for  the  subject  in  room  A 
entered the chamber and either covered or uncovered the monitor. The 
break between both runs was kept between three and five minutes. The 
non-stimulated  subject  was  not  informed  about  the  change  of 
conditions.
Data analysis
For the analysis,  offline EEG data were filtered to 0.15 - 30 Hz and 
visually inspected for artifacts. Data from both stimulated (A) and non-
stimulated  (B)  subjects  were  segmented  into  stimulation  and 
interstimulus epochs of one second duration, according to subject A’s 
stimulation  procedure. 
Segments  contaminated 
with  artifacts  were 
discarded  from  further 
evaluation;  the  average 
loss  rate  was  34%.  For 
subsequent  analyses,  the 
valid  segments  were 
detrended by subtracting 
each  segment’s  third-
order  polynomial 
approximation  from  the 
data.
In order to compare 
subject  B's  average  EEG 
power  between  subject 
A's  stimulation  and 
interstimulus  epochs,  a 
distribution-free  boot-
strapping procedure was 
developed  and  applied 
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Figure 3. Flow chart of EEG data processing 
(from Wackermann et al., 2004)
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by Wackermann et al  (2004).  Figure 3 illustrates the procedure as a 
flow chart (from Wackermann, 2004).
For  each  non-stimulated  subject,  valid  stimulation  (S)  and 
interstimulus  (I)  EEG  epochs  were  collected  in  two  pools.  All  NS 
stimulation epochs were averaged; the EEG power  Veff was calculated 
for the averaged signal as theroot mean square of voltage  ui of the  n 
single  data  points:  ∑
=
=
n
i
ieff un
V
1
21 .  From the  NI interstimulus  epochs, 
10000 subsets  were drawn randomly,  each comprising  NS segments. 
Within each subset,  the EEG power was computed for the averaged 
signal.  The  rank  R of  the  stimulation  epochs  EEG  power  was 
determined  within  the  cumulative  distribution  function  of  the 
interstimulus EEG power values for the 10000 subsets. The procedure 
was performed separately for each non-stimulated subject and for each 
EEG channel. Ranks  R, after division by the number of subsets, were 
within  the interval  [0,1]  and reflected the probability  of  receiving a 
smaller  value  than the actual  EEG power  value  out  of  an arbitrary 
subset of segments by the law of chance. Under the null-hypothesis, 
these ranks were assumed to be uniformly distributed between 0 and 
1].
The further evaluation steps were adopted from the precedent 
study (Wackermann et al., 2004). These comprised the transformation 
of  ranks  into  z-values,  the  collapsing  of  data  over  subjects,  the 
collapsing of data over channels using a chi-square statistic, and the 
overall  assessment  of  significance  for  the  study.  Two  different 
evaluations  were  performed,  based  on  different  time windows:  The 
EEG  power  was  calculated  for  two  different  time  windows:  a)  for 
whole stimulation epochs of one second and b) for a time window of 
136ms around the stimulated subject's maximum EEG response (which 
had been determined individually for each stimulated subject and for 
each channel electrode position).
For the present analysis, the statistical method was reconsidered 
in  detail,  and  certain  modifications  appeared  necessary.  These  are 
described in the following paragraph.
Modification 1: Sampling for the bootstrap
In  what  follows,  the  previous  sampling  procedure  turns  out  to 
systematically overestimate effects. From a theoretical point of view, 
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this  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  method  compared  one  sample 
('stimulation' epochs) drawn out of the data population with a second 
sample ('interstimulus'  epochs) drawn out of the data population by 
bootstrapping. This violates the premise of exchangeability of epochs 
between sample and reference (Edgington, 1987). As a consequence of 
this violation, the second sample, which was used as a reference for the 
first, does not adequately reflect the possible variability of the first but 
underestimates  it.  Therefore,  the  rank  of  the  first  mean  within  the 
distribution of means of all subsets is not equally distributed within 
the interval [0,1] but tends towards the extremes of the interval. This 
inevitably leads to an overestimation of significance of any observed 
deviations from randomness in either direction. A simplifying model 
simulation which uses numeric surrogate data instead of EEG epochs 
and which calculates t-tests for a control of the bootstrap, can illustrate 
this phenomenon: 
A pool of 1,000,000 standard-Gaussian distributed random real 
numbers served as data population. Out of this pool, a first random 
sample (sample 1) of N1 = 100 numbers was drawn, for which the mean 
μ1 was computed. This was to represent the pool of stimulation period 
values, but instead of sets of whole EEG segments (for later averaging 
and calculation of EEG power) only one single value μ1 for the mean of 
the drawn numbers was obtained.
Then, a second random sample (sample 2) with N2 = 300 numbers 
was  drawn  out  of  the  data  population,  representing  the  non-
stimulation  segments  pool  (which  is  larger,  about  three  to  one  in 
relation,  than  the  stimulation  segments  pool).  Out  of  this  second 
sample, 10,000 subsets of numbers were drawn, each as large as sample 
1, thus comprising N1 = 100 numbers each. For each subset, the mean 
was  computed,  resulting  in  10,000  mean  values.  The  cumulative 
distribution function of  these  mean values  allowed determining the 
rank R of μ1 (mean of sample 1) within all of the 10,000 subset means. 
According  to  the  pre-assumptions  of  the  applied  evaluation 
method, the rank R should become any value between 0 and 1 with the 
same probability (even independently from the distribution of values 
within the data population). After transformation of each rank R into a 
z-value  by  the  inverse  Gaussian  function,  z-values  of  multiple 
repetitions should be distributed standard-Gaussian.
In  order  to  test  this,  the  procedure  of  drawing  samples  as 
described above and calculating a rank  R for  μ1 was done repeatedly 
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100,000 times. Fulfillment of the null hypothesis, meaning that sample 
1  and sample  2  were  drawn out  of  the  same data  population,  was 
guaranteed by the model.
In parallel to the bootstrap-like method, the first (N1 = 100) and 
the  second  random  sample  (N2 =  300)  were  compared  for  mean 
difference  by  using  a  t-test  as  a  conventional  reference  method. 
Performing a  t-test was regarded as permissible, even with different 
sizes  of  sample  1  and  sample  2,  since  the  data  were  distributed 
Gaussian.
Every correct method of testing for mean difference should yield 
the same value p, which is the probability that the first sample is drawn 
out of a data population with a smaller mean value than the second 
sample. Given the correctness of the pre-assumptions, the results of the 
bootstrap and the t-test should be identical. The results are depicted in 
Figure 4. First, the results obtained by both methods (ranks R obtained 
from the bootstrap;  p-values obtained by the t-test) are compared in a 
scatterplot (Figure 4a); second, the distribution of these values in the 
interval [0;1] (pre-assumed to be uniform) is plotted (Figure 4b), and 
third, the distribution of the z-transformed values (pre-assumed to be 
distributed  standard-Gaussian)  is  plotted  (Figure  4c).  For  the 
bootstrap, the pre-assumption is clearly violated, while it is obviously 
fulfilled for the  t-test. Distribution plots for the bootstrap, but not for 
the  t-test, show an increased standard deviation (which, according to 
pre-assumptions, should be 1.0) and a tendency of results towards the 
extremes.
To rectify the observed bias,  the sampling procedure has been 
modified:  the  rank  R of  the  stimulation  epochs  EEG power  is  now 
calculated  within  multiple  subsets  drawn  from  a  reference  pool 
comprising  all stimulation  and  interstimulus  epochs  of  the  subject. 
This  modification  accomplishes  that  the  reference  pool,  now 
comprising all epochs, adequately represents the possible variability of 
EEG  measures  obtained  from  the  stimulation  epochs.  In  terms  of 
preassumptions  for  the  bootstrapping  procedure,  segments  are  now 
exchangeable.  The effect of this modification has been tested with the 
aforementioned numeric  surrogate  data.  The results  are  depicted in 
Figure 5 (with an arrangement corresponding to Figure 4). The ranks R 
obtained from the bootstrap were now found to be scattered within a 
small range around the p-value obtained from the t-test. (Additional 
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Figure 4. Original method of the bootstrap vs. 
t-test: comparison of results from the numeric 
simulation. (a) Scatterplot of ranks R (from the 
bootstrap) versus p-values (from the t-test). (b) 
Distribution  of  the  100,000  obtained  ranks R 
and the corresponding p-values yielded by the 
t-test. (c) Distribution of the ranks R (from the 
bootstrap)  versus  p-values  (from  the  t-test) 
after  z-transformation,  compared  with  the 
standard Gaussian distribution. (Note: the two 
spikes around 4.0 and -4.0 represent cases in 
which the mean of sample 1 was outside the 
range  of  all  subset  means;  instead  of  using 
infinite  values; they were summarized at the 
edge of the plotted range for illustration)
Figure 5. Modified method of the bootstrap vs. 
t-test: Comparison of results from the numeric 
simulation. (a) Scatterplot of ranks R (from the 
bootstrap) versus p-values (from the t-test).
(b) Distribution of the 100,000 obtained ranks R 
and the corresponding p-values yielded by the 
t-test. (c) Distribution of the ranks R (from the 
bootstrap) versus p-values (from the t-test) after 
z-transformation, compared with the standard 
Gaussian distribution
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analyses revealed that with an increased number of subsets this range 
converged to zero.)
Furthermore, in order to rule out a weakness in test power, an 
'effect'  of a known size (e.g. 0.1 standard deviations) was simulated. 
For this purpose, samples 1 and 2 were drawn out of two different data 
populations with the means μ1 and μ2. The difference between μ1 and 
µ2 was varied in order to simulate different  effect  sizes.  The results 
showed that  bootstrap  and t-test  yielded the  same p  values,  which 
suggests that the modified sampling procedure does not bias results in 
the case of an existing effect.
Modification 2: Correction for degrees of freedom
A second concern refers  to the collapsing of  results  over  EEG 
channels.  The  z-values  from  the  nineteen  EEG  channels  are  not 
independent from each other; the columns of z-values, each comprising 
the results from a single EEG channel for all subjects, are considerably 
intercorrelated. This implies that the chi-square resulting from these z-
values  has  less  than  nineteen  degrees  of  freedom.  Accordingly,  the 
application  of  a  chi-square  test  according  to  the  preassumption  of 
nineteen degrees of freedom (which would be appropriate in the case 
of independent channel  results)  will  overestimate the significance of 
any observed deviation from randomness. A correction for the degrees 
of freedom was achieved by using a Monte-Carlo simulation.
In multiple (5000) permutations of all EEG segments of a subject, 
segments  were  assigned  randomly to  either  the  'stimulation'  or  the 
'interstimulus' epoch pool; pool sizes NS and NI were adopted from the 
real study data. This assignment was performed once per subject and 
kept constant over the nineteen EEG channels (in order to adopt the 
degree of interdependence of the channelwise results from the study 
data).  For  each  such  permutation,  data  were  analyzed as  described 
above, which, after collapsing over subjects and over channels, resulted 
in a chi-square value for each time window (136 ms, 1000 ms) and each 
condition  (uncovered,  covered,  and  difference).  The  cumulative 
distribution  function  for  the  5000  collected  chi-square  values  was 
plotted. From this curve, for any chi-square value, a corresponding  p 
value  can  be  determined,  which  indicates  the  probability  of  not 
exceeding the according chi-square value by randomness.
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For  the  chi-square  values  obtained  as  study  results,  the 
corresponding p values were readable from the cumulative distribution 
functions  that  resulted  from  the  simulation.  This  allowed  an 
assessment  of  significance  which  was  corrected  for  the  degrees  of 
freedom of the EEG channels.
Results
All  analyses  have  been  performed  for  two  different  time 
windows,  136  ms  and  1000  ms;  the  results  are  described  for  both 
'uncovered'  and  'covered'  conditions,  as  well  as  for  the  difference 
between conditions. Channelwise results after collapsing z-values over 
subjects are summarized in Figure 6. Chi-square values, resulting from 
collapsing data over channels, are included for each time window and 
condition.
Figure 6. Results after collapsing over subjects: Channelwise z-values for the 136 ms and the 1000 
ms time window: 'uncovered' and 'covered' condition, and 'difference between conditions'. Chi-
square results after collapsing results over channels are included.
141
EEG correlations between separated subjects
 Figure 7. Cumulative chi-square distributions from the Monte-Carlo simulations; A: 136 ms 
window, B: 1000 ms window. Vertical, dashed lines denote the chi-square values obtained from the 
study for uncovered and covered conditions and the difference between them.  Corresponding  p 
values for any chi-squares are read from these distributions; vertical, solid lines mark the lower and 
upper cutoff  chi-squares  according to the significance  level  of  0.05 (two-tailed test).  The dotted 
curve reflects the cumulative chi-square distribution for nineteen degrees of freedom (reflecting the 
evaluation without correction for degrees of freedom)
Monte-Carlo simulations for both time windows were performed 
in order to estimate the statistical significance of the chi-squares (i.e. 
the  probability  with  which  pure  randomness  would  produce  larger 
effects  than  the  study  data).  The  results  from  the  Monte-Carlo 
simulations serve as a reference for the chi-squares obtained from the 
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study data, as depicted in Figure 7. It can also be read from the figure, 
which excessive significance levels would correspond to the obtained 
chi-squares  without  correction  for  the  degrees  of  freedom  (dotted 
lines).
Comparison with the previous method
In  order  to  estimate  the  effect  of  the  methodological 
modifications on the study results, the study data were also analyzed 
using  a)  the  previous  method  without  modifications  ('original 
method'), b) the previous method with change of only the sampling for 
the  bootstrap,  but  without  correction  for  degrees  of  freedom  ('new 
sampling'),  and c) the modified method ('new method').  Chi-squares 
and significance levels obtained from a), b),  and c) are compared in 
Table 1. Note that 'new sampling' and 'new method' do not differ with 
respect to chi squares but with respect to significance levels.
Table 1: Dependence of study results on the evaluation method: Chi-squares and significance
levels (p values for two-tailed testing, in brackets) obtained from the original method, obtained
after the modification of only the sampling procedure ('new sampling'), and obtained after
both modifications of the method ('new method')
136 ms 1000 ms
Original 
method
New 
sampling
New 
method
Original 
method
New 
sampling
New 
method
Uncovered (u) 21.43 
(.627)
17.05 
(.827)
17.05 
(.898)
33.91 
(.038)
23.31 
(.448)
23.31 
(.511)
Covered (c) 15.45 
(.623)
11.94 
(.224)
11.94 
(.303)
29.00 
(.132)
27.98 
(.168)
27.98 
(.297)
Difference (u-c) 30.69 
(.087)
23.21 
(.456)
23.21 
(.492)
49.66 
(.0003)
40.99 
(.0048)
40.99 
(.067)
A further Monte-Carlo simulation was performed to investigate 
the proportion of positive study outcomes with the previous method 
under fulfillment of the null-hypothesis.  The latter was achieved by 
multiple random permutations of all 'stimulation' and 'interstimulus' 
EEG epochs of a subject. Strikingly, the evaluation using the previous 
method without modification falsely led to 20.1% (26.2%) significant 
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results per condition for the 136 ms (1000 ms) time window, when the 
significance level α was actually set to 0.05. 
Discussion
The  present  study  on  correlations  in  the  EEG  of  spatially 
separated subjects aimed at a replication and possible clarification of 
the  effects  described  by  Wackermann  et  al.  (2004).  The  research 
paradigm was adopted from there.
The  EEG  power  of  the  non-stimulated  subject  did  not 
significantly differ between stimulation and interstimulus periods of 
the  stimulated  subject.  This  overall  result  was  obtained  after  two 
modifications  of  the  statistical  method:  A  change  in  the  sampling 
procedure for the bootstrapping, and a correction of the chi-square test 
for the degrees of freedom of the nineteen EEG channels. 
It  has  to  be  noted  that  the  chi-square  for  the  1000  ms  time 
window  and  'difference  between  conditions'  just  missed  the 
significance level and therefore might remain an object of discussion. 
On the other hand, a correction of the significance levels for multiple 
testing has to be considered, because a number of separate evaluations 
and significance assessments were performed a) for two different time 
windows and b) for the 'uncovered' and the 'covered' condition and for 
the difference between conditions. However, even without a correction 
for  multiple  testing,  none  of  the  six  chi-squares  exceeded  the 
significance level of 0.05. 
The overall result is seen as a negative outcome of the attempt to 
replicate  prior  findings  of  EEG  correlations  in  this  specific 
experimental paradigm. Of course, it may not be interpreted as a proof 
of the absence of the phenomenon under question; firstly and trivially, 
the  absence  of  an  effect  cannot  be  proven  by  an  unsuccessful 
replication  attempt;  secondly,  the  outcome  refers  to  the  specific 
constellation of EEG correlations if one subject is visually stimulated 
by checkerboard reversal, which is an abstract pattern. 
It is further suggested that the results presented here should not 
be discussed in terms of 'telepathy', which was the motivational origin 
of some early studies on EEG correlations between separated subjects 
(e.g.  Grinberg-Zylberbaum et al.,  1994).  The recent  discussion in the 
field  rather  refers  to  'non-local  correlations  between  distant  brains' 
which  is  a  broader  concept  than  the  assumption  of  a  directed 
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transmission of information by means of telepathy. Regardless of the 
viewpoint  however,  the  present  study  does  not  contribute  to 
substantiate the assumption of unexplainable non-local correlations.
Besides  the  failed  replication,  the  study  critically  revised  the 
statistical  procedure  applied  in  previous  studies.  It  revealed  the 
necessity to introduce two important changes.
With the previous method being applied without modification, 
results  for  the  1000  ms  (whole-epochs)  evaluation  suggested  a 
significant  change in the non-stimulated subject's  EEG power in the 
'uncovered'  condition,  with  a  highly  significant  difference  between 
'uncovered'  and  'covered'  conditions.  The  change  consisted  of  an 
increase  in  EEG  power  in  parietal,  predominantly  left-hemispheric 
regions and a decrease in bilateral  temporal  regions,  which is  quite 
different from the topography of the effects reported by Wackermann 
(2004). However, using the modified analysis, all observed changes in 
EEG  power  were  below  significance  level.  Therefore,  the  results 
obtained  from  the  previous  method  are  likely  due  to  inadequate 
statistical analyses.
It is expected that the results of those preceding studies, which 
used the statistical method discussed here without the two proposed 
modifications,  and  which  claimed  effects  unexplainable  by 
conventional physiology and physics, will undergo a decrease in effect 
size  and  significance  when  the  revised  method  is  applied  on  these 
data. From here, it cannot be estimated with precision, to what extent 
the previous results have been biased by the statistical method, and to 
what  extent  either  of  the  modifications  would affect  these  previous 
results.  However, both of the methodological annotations must have 
led into the same direction, namely to overestimate the effects under 
investigation.
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Dyadic EEG correlations re-examined:
A commentary on the replication study
by W. Ambach
Jirˇı´ Wackermann
Department of Empirical and Analytical Psychophysics
Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology and Mental Health
Freiburg i. Br., Germany
Some years ago we were reporting results of an electrophysiologi-
cal study (Wackermann et al., 2003) suggesting a relation between brain
states of two separated subjects, assessed by parallel EEG measurements
from both subjects. In an attempt to replicate the finding with an im-
proved experimental setup (Wackermann et al., 2003), we again found
deviations of our measure of interest from the null-hypothesis expecta-
tion, but showing a confusing (if any) pattern difficult to reconcile with
our earlier findings. We were facing a situation indicating either a ‘para-
normal’ nature of the alleged effect, or its possibly artefactual origin. A
follow-up study in our laboratory could not be carried out as planned
due to personnel changes in our department. Therefore, the opportu-
nity to arrange a replication study in co-operation with the research
group for Clinical and Physiological Psychology was welcomed. True
replication studies are rather rare; now there was an excellent opportu-
nity to test whether the same (or at least qualitatively similar) results can
be obtained in an independent study, in another laboratory and with a
different equipment, but following an identical experimental protocol.
The results of the replication study conducted by Dr Ambach are pre-
sented as a separate paper (Ambach, 2008), and we shall just add a few
comments.
———
Address correspondence to: Jirˇı´ Wackermann, Institut fu¨r Grenzgebiete der Psychologie und Psy-
chohygiene, Wilhelmstr. 3a, D-79098 Freiburg, Germany. E-mail: jw@igpp.de .
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Firstly, some introductory remarks for a reader who may not be
familiar with the research topic and its history. The problem under
study was introduced by Grinberg-Zylberbaum & Ramos (1987) and
Grinberg-Zylberbaum et al. (1994) who were searching for physiolog-
ical indicators of hypothetical non-sensory, ‘direct communication’ be-
tween two subjects. The term ‘correlation’ used in the title of the com-
mented paper and our earlier communications does not refer to cross-
correlations between native EEG signals. Rather, it refers to correla-
tion between brain states (see Wackermann, 2004), induced by sensory
stimulation at one of the subjects (A), and possibly revealed by a suit-
ably chosen signal parameter in the brain electrical activity of the other,
non-stimulated subject (B). Stimulus-onset aligned data averaging is
a standard technique used in studies of stimulus-related brain electri-
cal responses (also called ‘evoked potentials’, EP). The experimental
paradigm used in our studies was derived from that used by Grinberg-
Zylberbaum et al. (1994), who reported an EP-like activity in the subject
B’s averaged EEG recorded synchronously with subject A’s stimulation.
We could not confirm Grinberg-Zylberbaum’s finding of a ‘transferred
potential’, but we observed subtle power fluctuations of the averaged
EEG signal (Wackermann et al., 2003).1
Specifically, the parameter of interest was the effective voltage ra-
tio, Q ≡ Veff/Vref, where Veff was the effective voltage determined for
the averaged NS EEG data segments recorded during the visual stimula-
tion of the other subject (briefly: stimulation segments), and Vref was a
reference value determined from the same subject’s EEG data recorded
during the inter-stimulation periods. The data-analytic strategy applied
in our studies relied upon an elementary theorem of probability theory
(Feller, 1950): Let X be a continuous random variable with a cumulative
distribution function (CDF) FX(x) ≡ P(X < x); then the transformed
variable U = FX(X) is uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1], so the
CDF of U is FU(u) ≡ P(U < u) = u; a principle underlying all ‘tests of
significance’.2 Since we had no prior knowledge or a parametric model
1The exclusive focus on averaged EEG data was occasionally and deservedly criticised. It should
be clear from the above-said that this choice was historically determined: if we were designing a data-
analytic approach from scratch, certainly we would not begin with data averaging. This observation
also reveals limitations of the empiricist approach, building experiments by variations of others’ exper-
iments rather than on prior theoretical reasoning.
2Where usually the CDF of a test statistics, say, T, under a given hypothesis is derived analytically
and used to transform the observed values of T to U = FT(T) or, by convention, to its complement P =
1−U. It is the uniformity of the CDF of U what allows us to read the P-values directly as ‘probabilities’
of reaching the observed value of statistics T.
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of the distribution of Q, empirical CDFs of Q were constructed from re-
peated random drawings of inter-stimulation EEG data sub-sets from a
pool of a total size NI > NS. These CDFs were used to transform the
observed Q values for the stimulation EEG data, i.e., to determine their
ranks R with respect to a ‘reference population’ of non-stimulation Qs.
[The procedure was summarised in (Wackermann et al., 2004), Fig. 1,
reproduced in the commented paper as Fig. 3.] For the purpose of fi-
nal statistics, it was assumed that, under the null hypothesis, the ranks
R = FQ(Q) are uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Under this assumption,
values Z = Φ−1(R) would be normally distributed.
Ambach’s numerical simulations, based on random drawings from
a Gaussian pool (pp. 8*–9*) show that this assumption not necessarily
holds: the distribution of ranks evaluated with respect to empirical CDFs
may be non-uniform (p. 10*, Figs. 4a).3 The real distribution of Rs shows
a relative excess at the lower and upper ends of the [0,1] interval, which
results in a ∪-shaped PDF reminding of arcsin distribution. The devia-
tion from uniformity as such is not surprising; it can be easily predicted
for small samples from the discrete character of the ranks. What is rather
counter-intuitive — at least for a worker used to rely upon asymptotic
statistics — is that with increasing size of both samples the curvature
does not flatten to a uniform distribution; it only becomes smoother
but preserves its shape. This argument is essentially qualitative: it says
that the deviation from uniformity may in principle bias the rank-based
statistics; the outcome of the simulation is presented ‘as is’, and no ra-
tionale is given for the particular choice of simulation parameters.
It is, however, instructive to examine the distributions of empiri-
cally determined ranks with varied sample sizes. We used the same sim-
ulation procedure as Ambach, with only slightly different sum N1 + N2
= 360, instead of 400, and partitioned the total 360 in varied ratios. The
simulations4 (Fig. 1) reveal that the magnitude of deviation from unifor-
mity depends essentially on the samples size ratio N1/N2. For ratio 1/3
(Fig. 1, upper row, middle), the results agree with those reported by Am-
bach; the deviation is even more pronounced for ratio 1/2 (upper row,
middle). With decreasing N1/N2 ratio, however, the CDF comes closer to
the ideal form (see Fig. 1, lower row), so the deviation of Z-transformed
3In our view, the co-lateral argument based on parallel t-tests is rather diverting and obscuring the
central message, i.e., the deviation of ranks distribution from uniformity. We do not need a t-test to
know the theoretically correct distribution.
4The source C code of the simulation program is available on request from the author.
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Figure 1. Cumulative distribution functions of ranks R determined by numerical simulations
according to Ambach’s procedure, with varied sample sizes N1 (‘experimental’ sample) and N2
(‘reference’ sample). Ratios N1/N2 are (upper row) 1/2, 1/3, 1/5, (lower row) 1/7, 1/9, and
1/11. The dashed diagonal lines indicate the ideal (uniform) CDF. Note that from N1/N2 ≈ 0.1
on the deviation is almost negligible.
ranks, Z = Φ−1(R), would diminish with N1  N2. It follows, then,
that the rank-based procedure used in our earlier studies is in principle
sound if the samples size ratio is taken into account. The ratio NS/NI (stim-
ulation vs. inter-stimulation data segments) can be roughly determined
by the experimental design.5 Alternatively, the deviation from the uni-
form distribution could be modelled parametrically and corrected for in
subsequent steps of the analysis.
At any rate, Ambach’s study has pointed out that more attention
has to be paid to the construction of data-analytic methods used in
experimental studies of psycho(physio)logical or biophysical ‘anoma-
lies’. It has demonstrated that apparently ‘intuitive’ statistical proper-
ties must not be assumed without careful verification, especially where
relatively small samples (N ≈ 101 — 102) are concerned: an important
aspect that should be appreciated. However, the insights derived from
5We say ‘roughly’ because the exact value will depend on the data loss rate due to artifact elimina-
tion, and is thus not perfectly under experimenter’s control.
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the simulations should not be applied too hastily. In the commented
paper, the bare fact that P-values obtained from empirical distribution
functions by our original method may be biased was turned into an argu-
ment for the necessity of merging the two data subsets (stimulation and
inter-stimulation EEG segments), and for using the combined dataset as
a reference pool (p. 11*) — a point on which we disagree. It is difficult
to resist an impression that the eventually successful ‘deconstruction’ of
the effect under study serves here as a proof of statistical reconsidera-
tions and modifications based thereupon. We would prefer a systematic
study of the bias, focussing particularly on (i) a quantification of the
bias as to its dependence on the dataset size, and (ii) a more convincing
demonstration that the model used in demonstration of the bias applies
to analyses of real EEG data.
For a reader who may find our assessment slightly opinionated we
wish to add that we do not argue in favour of the ‘reality’ of the effect
under question. In fact, from our operationalist stance the phrase ‘re-
ally existing effect’ has no other meaning that ‘consistently reproducible
phenomenon’ (given that the necessary conditions for the phenomenon
are known). Reviewing results of our own replication study (Wacker-
mann et al., 2004), and taking into account the results reported by Am-
bach even without post hoc corrections, it is highly doubtful that there is
anything such as a ‘real’ effect. This negative evidence arises from the
remarkable lack of consistency, in terms of direction and spatial distri-
bution of the effect measures, and is thus based more on a visceral feel-
ing for ‘what is like real physiology’ than on formal statistical inference.
———
Our final comment is not related directly to the commented study
but, generally, to studies of correlations between physiological activi-
ties of separated subjects, or any biophysical ‘anomalies’ of similar sort.
During the last few decades, the search for so-called ‘physiological signs
of psi’ (Beloff, 1974) went through several waves of enthusiasm, of-
ten elicited by novel experimental approaches (‘direct communication’,
‘direct mental interaction between living systems’, ‘presentiment’, etc),
and sometimes claimed to promise a fundamental revision of our view
of nature (e.g., quantum-like ‘entanglement’ between human brains, ‘re-
versal of time arrow’, etc).
As to our knowledge, none of those high hopes has ever been full-
filled, and none of those approaches developed into a really working ex-
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perimental paradigm — that is, one yielding reproducible results across
laboratories, results that would visibly stand out of the bush of error
bars. There are no signs of real progress. May each individual researcher
draw her/his conclusions from this observation. We take the lesson se-
riously and turn to more productive research topics, not to spend our
lives in a heroically ‘relentless’ but ultimately unproductive search.
Acknowledgements
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Abbreviations and mathematical symbols
CDF cumulative distribution function
EEG electroencephalogram
EP evoked potential
PDF probability density function
FX CDF of random variable X
Φ CDF of normally distributed random variable
Φ−1 inverse function to Φ
N sample size
P probability of an observed event
P probability associated with a test statistics
Q effective voltage ratio
R rank value
U uniformly distributed random variable
Veff effective voltage (stimulation)
Vref reference effective voltage (inter-stimulation)
X random variable, general
Z random variable, normally distributed
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Lunar-magnetotail Encounters as Modulators of 
Mind-Matter Interaction Effects
Eckhard Etzold
Society for Anomalistics, Postfach 1202, D-69200, Sandhausen, Deutschland
Abstract
Mind-matter interaction (MMI) effects are controversial partially  
due to a lack of a theory that persuasively explains such effects, and  
also  due  to  the  difficulty  of  replicating  empirical  effects  in  
controlled  experiments.  One  potential  explanation  for  this  
empirical capriciousness might be the presence of physical factors  
which  modulate  MMI  performance.  One  previously  suggested  
variable has been the Earth's geomagnetic field; another is the lunar  
phase. The hypothesis that the Moon's interaction with the Earth's  
magnetosphere  modulates  MMI  performance  was  tested  in  data  
collected  in  a  long-term,  online  MMI  experiment.  The  analysis  
showed a clear influence of the Earth's magnetotail  in the MMI 
results, confirming the hypothesis. This suggests that phenomena  
relying on purported MMI may be more efficacious during quiet  
geomagnetic periods of the full moon, when the Moon is passing  
deep through the inner plasma sheet of the magnetotail 
Introduction
 
Mind-matter interaction (MMI) is the hypothesized ability of the 
mind to influence matter or energy without the use of any currently 
known  physical  means.  Spiritual  healing,  psychokinesis,  distant 
healing, and unusual human-machine interactions might be based on 
MMI effects (Heath, 2003). Although hundreds of laboratory studies 
seem to provide evidence of MMI, the existence of such effects remains 
controversial  because  there  are  no  convincing  theoretical  reasons  to 
explain how such effects  may exist  (Bösch,  Steinkamp,  Boller,  2006; 
Radin, Nelson, Dobyns, Houtkooper, 2006). Barring theory, the central 
Correspondence details: Eckhard Etzold, Grosse Grubestr. 2A, D-38122 Braunschweig, Deutschland. 
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issue in this line of research has been the question of reliability. For 
example,  a  large-scale,  multi-laboratory  replication  effort  failed  to 
repeat previously successful MMI experiments reported by Princeton 
University’s Engineering Anomalies Research Laboratory (Jahn et al., 
2000). While critics might point to the failure to replicate as evidence 
that MMI does not exist, another interpretation is that we do not fully 
understand  the  conditions  under  which  MMI  is  best  demonstrated. 
This prompted a search for environmental parameters which modulate 
the MMI performance  via enhancing or  reducing human powers  of 
concentration. 
Geomagnetic effects on human behaviour
The  influence  of  subtle  electromagnetic  effects  on  our  human 
nervous  system  has  been  a  topic  of  scientific  research  for  decades. 
Evidence of an effect of ELF electromagnetic fields on human pineal 
gland function was reported (Wilson et al., 1990) and rejected (Gobba, 
Bravo,  Scaringi  &  Roccatto,  2006).  Persinger  found  correlations  of 
geomagnetic  activity  with  enhanced  anxiety,  sleep  disturbances, 
altered  moods,  and  greater  incidences  of  psychiatric  admissions 
(Persinger,  1987).  Researchers  had reported that poltergeist  episodes 
frequently begin on the day of a sudden and intense increase in global 
geomagnetic  activity  (Gearhart  &  Persinger,  1986).  Sturrock  (2004) 
analysed data of UFO events and found significant correlations with 
local  sidereal  time.  Spottiswoode  (1990)  reported  the  existence  of  a 
negative  correlation  between  scores  in  free  response  anomalous 
cognition  experiments  and  geomagnetic  fluctuations.  Sudden  infant 
deaths seem to be associated with continuous micropulsations in times 
when global geomagnetic activity is very low (O'Connor & Persinger, 
1999). Increased solar and geomagnetic activity seems to be associated 
with  increased  arterial  blood  pressure  (Ghione,  Mezzasalma,  Del 
Seppia  &  Papi,  1998).  Distinct  effects  of  the  Moon  on  geomagnetic 
activity were also reported (Bigg, 1963; Bell and Defouw, 1964; Knott, 
1975).
Despite  the  large  volume  of  reports,  in  total  we  do  not  really 
understand  the  role  of  these  electromagnetic  and  geomagnetic 
interactions  on  human  behaviour.  Neither  do  we  understand  the 
underlying mechanism of MMI effects. As a result, attempts to explore 
MMI effects  by  using patients  as  targets  might  raise  serious  ethical 
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problems, since we don’t know when MMI effects might be healing or 
harming others. All that have today is nothing more than some small 
pieces of a jigsaw. The use of MMI experiments with a random number 
generator as a target for the evaluation of the effectiveness of global 
geomagnetic activity on human behaviour does minimize the risk of 
adverse effects on the health of subjects and is thus ethically safe. It is a 
great way to learn more about this still unexplored realm of human 
ability and behaviour. 
Lunar phase effects in MMI data
In an earlier study, Radin (1997) claimed evidence of MMI effects 
in casino pay-out rates which depended on the lunar phase. The peak 
effect  was  found within  one  day of  the  full  moon.  Based on  many 
previous studies examining correlations between the strength of  the 
Earth’s  geomagnetic  field  (GMF)  flux  and  purported  psychic 
experiences,  it was predicted that the casino pay-out rates would be 
negatively correlated with GMF. Radin found a higher than average 
payout rate on full  moon days of  quiet  geomagnetic  activity,  and a 
lower  than  average  payout  rate  on  full  moon  days  with  high 
geomagnetic  activity.  In  both  cases  yet,  the  correlation  would  be 
negative. Thus, we may assume that the effects might cancel each other 
out.
These  results  might  indicate  that  the  human  power  of 
concentration  is  affected  by  a  geomagnetic  parameter.  Recently, 
Sturrock and Spottiswoode (2007) reported a significant lunar-periodic 
effect  in  free  response  anomalous cognition experiment  data,  which 
might also confirm this relationship of a lunar-geomagnetic parameter 
and the human power of concentration.
Attempts to independently check Radin’s claims using data from a 
large-scale, online MMI experiment revealed evidence for a complex 
solar-periodic full moon effect (Etzold, 2000; Etzold, 2002).
The Fourmilab Retropsychokinesis Project
Etzold (2005) analysed data of the Fourmilab RetroPsychoKinesis 
Project,  an  online  experiment  which  “explores  the  purported 
anomalous  effect  known  as   retropsychokinesis”1,  also  known  as 
1http://www.fourmilab.ch/rpkp/proposal.html
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“retroPK“. RetroPK is a hypothesized ability to retroactively influence 
random  data  via  MMI.  Another  hypothesis,  the  Decision 
Augmentation  Theory  (DAT),  attempt  to  explain  retropsychokinesis 
effects  with  an  anomalous  information  transfer  by  decision 
augmentation. This means that people are somehow able to foresee the
future and intuitively feel which goal of the experiment might be more 
promising (May, Utts & Spottiswoode, 1995). If the DAT hypothesis is 
true,  one  would  expect  in  case  of  strong  MMI  effects  in  the 
experimental data a reverse effect in control data taken from the same 
database.  Since DAT can be reduced to intuitive data selection,  this 
might be in fact a kind of data splitting. The lack of any reverse effects 
in  control  data  might  indicate  that  the  hypothesis  of  retroactive 
influence  is  more qualified to explain the effects  than intuitive data 
selection.
Random data for the Fourmilab test  are derived from the HotBits 
hardware  random  number  generator  (RNG)  based  on  radioactive 
decay2.  Date  and  time  stamps  for  each  experimental  result, 
downloaded from that  website,  were converted to a lunar  phase in 
degrees.  105 Subsets  or bins were created for each lunar cycle from 
January  1997  to  October  2005 (Etzold,  2005).  These  MMI data  were 
correlated with F10.7 solar  radio flux,  sunspot  numbers,  solar  wind 
speed  and  GMF  ‘ap’-index  data.  Significant  results  were  found  for 
MMI data correlated with F10.7 solar radio flux and sunspot numbers. 
The correlation of the GMF ‘ap’-index data with MMI data was barely 
significant  on  the  p  =  .05-level.  This  barely  significant  result  might 
depend on remaining diurnal variations in the GMF ‘ap’-index data. 
Therefore we tried another analysis with reduced diurnal variations in 
the GMF ‘ap’-index data, and we expected an increasing significance 
for the correlations of the GMF ‘ap’-index data with MMI data.
The Moon-magnetotail interaction hypothesis
A hypothesis was suggested by earlier analyses that the Moon’s 
interaction  with  Earth’s  magnetosphere  during  the  Moon’s  passage 
through  the  magnetotail  in  full-Moon  times  might  modulate  MMI 
performance (Etzold, 2005). We wanted to test this hypothesis and see 
whether high and low MMI effects in the full-Moon interval could be 
explained by changing geomagnetic activity. 
2 http://www.fourmilab.ch/rpkp/experiments/contents.html
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While the effective parameter responsible for modulating MMI 
performance remains unknown, analyses seemed to indicate that the 
origin  of  this  parameter  may  be  located  in  the  lunar  phase.  We 
assumed more precisely that the actual source of this parameter may 
be based on lunar-magnetotail interactions. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the Earth’s magnetosphere is distorted 
by the solar wind into a teardrop shape, which extends far into deep 
space (Tsyganenko, 1995). The magnetotail of this drop stretches in a 
direction opposite to the Sun, and reaches beyond the lunar orbit. The 
solar wind follows a path that goes around the Earth in a sort of cover 
or  sheath.  This  is  the  magnetosheath  plasma  region.  Between  the 
magnetosphere  and  the  magnetosheath  is  the  magnetopause.  The 
magnetotail is divided into the outer lobes and the inner plasma sheet.
During  the  full  moon  interval,  the  Moon  passes  the 
magnetosheath  plasma  and  the  lobes  of  the  magnetotail  for 
approximately  four  days  (Schubert,  Sonett,  Smith,  Colburn  & 
Schwartz, 1975).
An  indicator  for  the  extent  that  the  Moon  spends  in  the 
magnetotail is the time the Moon spends in the inner plasma sheath 
(figure 2). This time varies from 0-15 hours per month at a minimum 
rising to 60-75 hours per month at the maximum with the 18-year Saros 
period  (Hapgood,  2007)  and  with  the  varying  solar  activity 
(Tsyganenko and Sitnov,  2007)  of  the 11-year solar cycle.  The lunar 
orbit is tilted in relation to the ecliptic, and in this way the Moon can 
pass above, below, or directly through the plasmasheet, depending on 
the Moon’s position in the Saros period.3 The last period of maximum 
length of time the Moon spent in the plasmasheet was from 1993 to 
2001, and the next period of maximum length is expected around 2011 
to  2019.  These  are  very  promising  time  intervals  for  studying 
fullmoon-MMI effects. From 2003 to 2010 there is a period of minimum 
length, leading to the  expectation of low fullmoon-MMI effects. But 
even when the Moon is expected to pass through the magnetotail, a 
sudden collapse of the entire nightside field with the magnetotail can 
happen when a strong geomagnetic storm is triggered by high solar 
activity.
3 An animated .gif-file  created by M.  Hapgood,  showing the lunar crossing of the  magnetotail 
around the full moon in December, 2007, is available at 
http://uk.geocities.com/mike.hapgood@btinternet.com/moon_movie_6.gif.
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In view of the hypothesis that an unknown parameter is 
modulating  MMI  performance  which  results  from  the  Moon’s 
interaction with the magnetotail, one might assume that the correlation 
of MMI data with GMF ‘ap’-index data might yield more significant 
results.  But this was not the case in the Etzold study (2005). Higher 
significance was found for perihelion parameters like F10.7 solar radio 
flux and sunspot numbers. The current paper will show that this lack 
of  significance is  due to  the properties  of  the GMF ‘ap’-index data. 
Therefore,  the  data  in  the  present  analysis  were  retrieved from the 
same retroPK database for the same evaluation period as mentioned 
before.  These are all  MMI data from the time period of January 11, 
1997, 17:33 UTC through October 8, 2005, 12:45 UTC, all of which fulfil 
the specifications of the Fourmilab RetroPsychokinesis Project. Newer 
data were ignored and retained for future replication attempts. 
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Figure 1. Earth’s magnetosphere. Picture was provided by NASA.
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Methods
We wanted to see what the solar-periodic full moon effect looks like 
because  the  lunar-GMF-MMI  hypothesis  stated  that  the  Moon’s 
interaction  with  Earth’s  magnetosphere  during  the  Moon’s  passage 
through  the  magnetotail  at  full  moon  times  might  modulate  MMI 
performance.  We therefore scanned the data with a sliding window 
function over the whole lunar phase. We used the GMF ‘ap’-index data 
which provide  the  average  global  geomagnetic  field  activity  over  a 
three hour period. The GMF ‘ap’-index data were obtained in a fixed 
time interval of every three hours. This results in a constant number of 
GMF ‘ap’-index data for every day of the successive lunar cycles. 
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Figure 2. Hours, the Moon spends in the inner plasmasheet. Detail of a plot by Mike 
Hapgood (2007),  and  figure  was  treated  by  the  author.  Bright  areas  mark  time 
intervals  of  deep lunar  encounters  with  the  inner  magnetotail,  and with  a  high 
fullmoon-MMI effect expectation.
Lunar-magnetotail Encounters as Modulators of MMI Effects
Three different data bases are available on the Fourmilab server: 
MMI ‘for  the record’  data,  MMI ‘practice’  run data and control  run 
data. Here, we are analyzing the MMI ‘for the record’ data and also 
‘practice’ run data and control run data for a comparison. 
The properties of the data
The  MMI  ‘for  the  record’  experiment  data  were  only  recorded 
when somebody was conducting an experiment. Thus, the amount of 
experimental  data varied largely for the same interval  of  successive 
lunar cycles with a minimum of 152 and a maximum of 5,555 ‘for the 
record’ experiments per lunar cycle. In total,  199,632 ‘for the record’ 
experiments and 202,958 practice run results for the experiment time 
interval  of  January  11,  1997 to  October  8,  2005 are  evaluated.  Since 
December  26,  1997  control  experiments  have  also  been  running 
automatically,  exactly  one  run  every  hour,  totalling  59,860  as  of 
October 8, 2005. The first and second generation HotBits configuration 
used a Windows 95 machine which “crashed every couple of months 
for no discernible reason“4. As a consequence, the Hotbits server was 
upgraded  in  September  2006  with  a  far  more  reliable  Linux-based 
server (Fedora Core 5). 
Further complicating matters is the fact that the control runs do 
not  really  match  the  MMI  data.  While  there  are  199,632  MMI 
experimental  data  in  the  evaluation  period,  only  59,860  control  run 
data are at hand which are a little bit more then a third of the MMI 
data  volume.  In  addition,  practice  run  results  were  usually  not 
reported. But due to the important issue of control data, we have to 
consider every source of information and as a result we looked at the 
available practice run results.
GMF ‘ap’-index data and diurnal effects 
The GMF activity varies in diurnal rhythm and with the location 
on Earth. Besides day and night changes, another reason for diurnal 
variations is the fact  that Earth’s geomagnetic poles do not conform 
with  the  Earth’s  geographic  poles.  As  a  result,  Earth’s  magnetotail 
shifts in diurnal rhythms. However, the GMF ‘ap’-index data represent 
a global average of GMF activity as an integer value with minimized 
4http://www.fourmilab.ch/hotbits/hardware3.html
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diurnal rhythm. For example, the exact full moon time might be in one 
lunar cycle at noon (e.g., 12:00 UTC) with a lower GMF level and in the 
evening (e.g., 18:00 UTC) of another lunar cycle when the GMF level is 
higher. Both time intervals might yield the same GMF ‘ap’-index data 
value, but the effect of the lunar/GMF interaction might be completely 
different. Etzold (2005) computed the correlations of MMI data with 
GMF  ‘ap’-index  data  for  every  lunar  cycle  separately.  For  our 
evaluation  here  this  means  that  we  have  to  combine  the  data  of 
multiple lunar phases in order to minimize diurnal effects and make 
the data compatible. This means that effects, by accumulation, become 
evident  which  are  not  present  if  we  evaluate  data  of  single  lunar 
phases with much smaller volumes of data. Eight GMF ‘ap’-index data 
values  were obtained every day,  and reduced diurnal  effects  in the 
MMI data  can be expected if  no  fewer than four  lunar  cycles  were 
included in each subset. This is the case if we divide the entire database 
into 16 subsets,  each with 12,500 MMI ‘for the record’  experimental 
data, and the last with 12,132 experimental data. Date and time stamps 
of these data were converted into lunar phase in degrees and sorted 
according to ascending lunar phase for each subset. 
The control run, practice run, and GMF ‘ap’-index data were also 
divided into 16 subsets but with a different number of experiments per 
subset  with respect  to the time intervals of  the MMI data to enable 
comparability of the results. Date and time stamps of these data were 
also converted  into lunar  phase  in degrees  and sorted according to 
ascending lunar phase for each subset. 
Configuring the full moon interval & tests with different sliding window widths
The time interval which the Moon spends in the magnetosphere is 
estimated  at  four  days.  Radin  and  Rebman  (1998)  mentioned  an 
interval of one day within the full moon period in which the full moon 
effect was found in the casino data. Including the day before and the 
day after the full moon day, this constitutes an interval of three days 
centered  around  the  time  of  the  full  moon.  On  one  day  the  Moon 
moves  12.19°  along  its  orbit  on  average.  Thus,  Radin’s  full  moon 
interval  is  equivalent  to  161.7°  to  198.3°  lunar  phase.  Etzold  (2000) 
mentioned a lunar phase interval of 166.5° to 192.4° of approximately 
two days. Since we compute time intervals in lunar phase in degrees, 
we have 25° lunar phase as a minimum for a two-day interval and 50° 
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lunar phase as  a  maximum for  a four day interval.  For  finding the 
maximum magnitude of an assumed full moon effect in the MMI data, 
we check all data in steps of 5°, beginning with 25° and ending with 
50°. This different window size test should ensure that the effect is not 
sensitive to the percentage of the lunar cycle that is analysed.
The data of each MMI subset  and the corresponding GMF ‘ap’-
index data subset  were sorted according to the the increasing lunar 
phase with overlapping data for the new moon interval. A computing 
function with a window width of 25° up to 50°, starting with 0° and up 
to  360°,  overlapping  in  the  start  and  end-interval,  scanned 
simultaneously the first MMI subset and the corresponding GMF ‘ap’-
index data subset synchronously from the beginning to the end and 
calculated  the  correlation  value  for  every  step  (0.5°).  The  sliding 
window  function  computed  the  MMI  average  effect  size  and  the 
average  GMF  ‘ap’-index  value  for  every  step.  For  these  values, 
Pearson’s r was computed. Since we have 16 subsets, we get 16 Pearson 
correlation values for each step of the sliding window function. The 
following checklist displays the basic steps of the analysis:
1. Download the MMI data from the Fourmilab server1.
2. Convert  UNIX  time  into  UTC  date  and  time,  and  hexadecimal 
experiment data into a bit score.
3. Divide the dataset into ‘for the record’ and practice data.
4. Check  databases  for  data  which  do  not  conform with  the 
Fourmilab Retropsychokinesis Project specifications.
5. Create 16 subsets with 12,500 MMI experimental data lines each.
6. Convert  date  and   time  of  each  experiment  into  a  lunar  phase 
degree with 0° for new moon, 90° for the first  quarter,  180° for full 
moon and 270° for the last quarter.
7. Sort  data  according  to  increasing  lunar  phase  for  each  subset, 
starting with 0° and ending with 360°
8. Copy data with lunar phase < 60° and add 360 for every subset. 
Insert these data at the end of each subset for overlapping scans at new 
moon position.
9. Perform the same procedure for control run and practice run data.
10. Download GMF ‘ap’-index data5.
5The GMF 'ap'-index data were retrieved from the World Data Center for Geomagnetism, Kyoto. 
http://swdcdb.kugi.kyoto-u.ac.jp/
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11. Eight GMF ‘ap’-index data were obtained per day. Complete hour 
and minute information of the middle of each three-hour ‘ap’-index 
interval.
12. Take date and time of the beginning and the end of each MMI 
data and divide the GMF ‘ap’-index data into corresponding subsets.
13. Do steps 6 to 8 with GMF ‘ap’-index data.
14. Create  a  sliding window function which computes  Rosenthal’s 
effect size for the MMI, practice and control run data and the average 
values for the corresponding GMF ‘ap’-index data.
15. Adjust the window width of the sliding window function (25°, 
30°, 35°, 40°, 45°, and 50°).
16. Move the sliding window in steps of 0.5° over the entire lunar 
phase synchronously over all subsets. 
17. Correlate the effect size values with the average GMF ‘ap’-index 
data for every sliding window step.
18. Plot the Pearson correlation values.
Tests with split data
A split data test checks that the effect found is not an artifact of the 
precise sequence of recorded data. Therefore, the relevant data set was 
divided randomly into two samples. If there is a non-random effect in 
the data it will be present in both data sets. Two empty data samples 
were  generated  for  the  data  split.  A pseudo random function  with 
current time as a random seed returned a number between 0 and 1 for 
every data split. If the pseudo random number was > 0.5, data were 
saved in sample #1, otherwise in sample #2. In this way, we obtained 
two samples which are independent of each other. The window width 
of the sliding window function was set to 36.6°, which is similar to the 
range of the full moon interval defined by Radin. Both samples were 
correlated with the GMF ‘ap’-index data set. For both data sets we ran 
the  sliding  window  function  across  each  data  set  in  steps  of  0.5°, 
resulting in two rows of 16 average GMF ‘ap’-index data values and 16 
corresponding effect size per trial values for every 0.5° step. For this 
pair of 16 values each, Pearson’s  r with N = 16 was computed, so we 
got 720 Pearson correlation values for one sliding window function test 
across the whole lunar cycle.
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Results
The  overall  results  for  the  total  of  199,632  ‘for  the  record’ 
experiments  yielded  a  per  trial  effect  size  of  .49997  (where  0.5  is 
expected by chance in this test) which is equivalent to a nonsignificant 
z score of -0.82. The control runs yielded a per trial effect size of .50038 
which is equivalent to a nonsignificant z score of 0.82, and the practice 
runs yielded a per trial effect size of .50001 which is equivalent to a 
nonsignificant  z score  of  0.32.  But  we have already seen that  Radin 
found a full moon effect in the casino data with a higher payout rate 
within the days of the full moon,  and we can assume that the total 
payout rate of the casino might not be significantly above the mean 
chance expectation. Otherwise, casino holders might worry about their 
future. If Radin’s full moon effect is based on MMI, we can expect a 
similar effect in the Fourmilab Retropsychokinesis data.  
Control run and practice data correlation results
A test  with randomly split  data  was executed for  the 36.6°  full 
moon  interval  (161.7°  to  198.3°).  The  control  and  practice  run  data 
yielded  non-significant  correlation  values.  For  the  first  control  run 
sample r(14) was -.15, and for the second sample r(14) was -.09. For the 
first practice data sample r(14) was .01, and for the second sample r(14) 
was .13. Thus, we might assume that there is no periodical bias in the 
data which could generate the full moon effect found in the MMI data. 
Figure 3 shows the results for the control run data. 
The control  runs showed a random walk of the curves.  No full 
moon effect and no other coherent effects are visible in this figure. This 
seems to indicate that the HotBits hardware random number generator 
is working well for our purposes here.
MMI ‘for the record’ data correlation results
The test with randomly split data yielded the highest correlation 
value for MMI data. The first sample data yielded  r(14) = -.62 with  p 
= .005, one-tailed, and the second sample data yielded r(14) = -.54 with 
p = .015, one-tailed. Both datasets showed strong negative correlations 
which might  indicate  that  there  is  a  non-random trend in the data. 
Figure 4 shows the results for the MMI ‘for the record’ data. By visual 
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inspection, both curves showed a similar peak in the full moon interval 
which reached significance.  This might  indicate that  there  is  a  non-
random trend in both datasets which is lunar phase dependent.
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Figure 3. Smoothed epoch analysis for the split control run data vs. GMF ‘ap’-index data. Data set A: 
grey line; data set B: black line.
Figure 4. Smoothed epoch analysis for the split MMI ‘for the record’ experiment data vs. GMF ‘ap’-
index data. Data set A: grey line; data set B: black line.
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Correlation results of non-split data & with different scanning window widths
We wished to plot the shape of the full moon effect and therefore 
the entire non-split MMI database was scanned with different sliding 
window widths of 25°, 30°, 35°, 40°, 45°, and 50°, starting at 0° through 
360°, moving in steps of 0.5° for each correlation value. Figure 5 shows 
the results:
We found a sharply-defined full moon correlation effect which is 
visible for all scanning window widths. The peak effect was found at 
3.5° before  full  moon with  r(14) =  .804 and 40° window width.  The 
shape  of  the  full  moon  peak  resembled  an  imprint  of  Earth’s 
magnetotail  in the correlation data.  A comparison with other  Moon 
phase intervals showed that this strong negative correlation only exists 
for the full moon interval. 
Table 1 lists the correlation values of the full moon MMI data for 
different window widths, centered at full moon and for comparison, 
the correlation values for the remaining non-full moon data.
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Figure 5. Epoch analysis for the retro-PK ‘for the record’ experiment data vs. GMF ‘ap’-index data 
with different scanning window widths.
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Table 1. Pearson Correlation values for 180° lunar phase (full moon) 
and the remaining non-full moon data with n = 16.
Window 
width
Pearson correlation of 
full moon data
Pearson correlation of 
non-full moon data
 25° -.46*  -.030
30° -.59** -.026
35° -.69** -.008
40° -.76***  .008
45° -.69**  .008
 50° -.62**  .066
* p < .05; ** p < .01;  *** p < .001 (all probabilities one-tailed)
All MMI data of the full moon intervals yielded significant results. 
For Radin’s exact full moon interval of 161.7° to 198.3° lunar phase, we 
got r(14) = -.74 with p = .0005, one-tailed due to Radin’s prediction of a 
negative correlation.  The  subset  with  the lowest  average  GMF ‘ap’-
index data value of 8.41 yielded a MMI per trial effect size of .5008 with 
a standard error  of  .00043,  and the subset  with the highest  average 
GMF ‘ap’-index data value of 29.1 yielded a MMI per trial effect size 
of .4993 with a standard error of .0004. 
With a window width of 25° we found the initial point of the full 
moon correlation effect at 153° lunar phase and the end point at 198° 
lunar phase.  With a window width of 50°, the initial  point is at  the 
position of 155° lunar phase and the end of the full moon effect at 208° 
lunar phase. This is the range in which we expect the Moon’s transit 
through the magnetotail  of the Earth.  The Moon might pass the tail 
magnetopause between 198° and 208° (mean = 203°) and between 153° 
and 155° (mean = 154°) lunar phase, based on the observations here. 
The resulting average width of  the Earth’s  magnetotail  in the lunar 
orbit might be 49° lunar phase or a time interval of 4 days. 
The center of the magnetotail in the lunar orbit might not be the exact full moon 
time, but 6 hours and 53 minutes before the exact full moon time. This might be in 
accordance with the expected shape of Earth’s magnetotail due to the fact that the 
magnetotail is blown over by the interplanetary magnetic field.
Discussion
The tests in the current study seem to confirm previous observations 
of MMI-lunar relationship dependent on geomagnetic activity. If  we 
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assume that medical treatment such as distant healing or anomalous 
healing  depend  on  MMI,  then  we  may  expect  that  these  medical 
treatments might also be modulated by lunar-GMF effects, especially at 
full  moon  times  of  low GMF activity.  But  this  is  contrary  to  other 
findings. For example, Palmer, Baumann and Simmonds (2006) studied 
the  magnetic  influence  on  MMI  effects  whilst  influencing  the 
hemolysis of  red blood cells,  and wrote with respect  to their study: 
“The  most  sobering  implication  of  our  data  ...  derives  from  the 
evidence of hemolysis acceleration. Translated into healing terms, this 
means that healers could unintentionally ‘mis-direct’ their PK to make 
an illness worse rather than better. ... If the finding with the Ap index 
continues to hold up, it may suggest that healing should be performed 
on a day following that when the global GMF is relatively high.“ The 
findings in the current study suggest that this statement is too general. 
The actual situation seems to be more complex. Healers might perform 
better  on  days  of  low  GMF  activity  in  full  moon  times  with  deep 
plasmasheet encounters. But if they try to heal at full moon times of 
extreme high GMF activity, they could make an illness worse rather 
than better because MMI might be active, but working against their 
intention. 
An important  observation in this  analysis  might  be the difference 
between MMI ‘for the record’ data and the practice data for the full 
moon interval. While a remarkable full moon effect was found in the 
MMI ‘for the record’ data, it is completely absent in the practice run 
data. Due to the fact that practice and MMI ‘for the record’ data were 
taken  from  the  same  random  source,  one  might  assume  that  the 
difference might be due merely to psychological factors. The missing 
full moon effect in the practice data might indicate that a non-serious 
attempt to “influence” the output of the RNG might fail to produce a 
full moon effect. It might be dependent on the strength or gravity of 
intent. Practice alone does not yield a result. Translated into healing 
terms, this means that praying, wishing and healing without a serious 
intent might not yield a result.
Another point is the accurate shape of the full-Moon effect. We don’t 
know  what  happens  when  the  Moon  is  passing  through  the 
magnetotail  but  we  may  assume  that  a  physical  parameter  is 
influenced which has a strong effect on the human mind to influence 
matter  without  the  use  of  any  currently  known  type  of  physical 
mechanisms. The current findings suggest that MMI might not be an 
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elusive and weak effect but rather a stronger and more reliable effect if 
we knew the crucial parameters and could apply them systematically 
in MMI research. 
We also  do  not  understand  the  exact  structure  of  Earth's  farther 
magnetosphere.  What  we  have  are  reconstructions  and  theoretical 
models  of  the  geomagnetic  field  as  observed  by  spacecraft  data 
(Tsyganenko, 1995). These spacecraft are located at a distance of 3 to 40 
Earth radii maximum (Tsyganenko and Sitnov, 2007). If the sources of 
this MMI effect observed here are based upon interactions of the Moon 
with the Earth’s magnetotail, then we have a well-formed imprint of 
the  farther  magnetosphere  which,  beyond  the  use  of  expensive 
spacecraft,  give  us  empirical  clarification  about  the  location  of  the 
magnetopause and the shape of the farther magnetotail at a distance of 
about  60  Earth  radii.  It  seems  to  be  unique  in  parapsychological 
research that an unusual MMI effect might be able to operate as a low 
cost probe for geomagnetic tail research.
While the casino data in the Radin study were generated at the same 
time and in the same location where they had been “treated”, the MMI 
data  had already been generated  at  an unknown time before  being 
used in the Fourmilab RetroPsychokinesis Project. They were delayed 
for hours, days, or perhaps weeks, and they were generated far away 
from the participants’ location. In both cases, we noticed an unusual 
effect,  phase  locked with the synodic  lunar phase.  If  the retroactive 
psychokinesis effect really exists (Schmidt, 1976) ‒ and the lack of any 
reverse effect in control and practice data support this assumption  ‒ 
we would not expect an effect in the parts of the lunar phase where the 
random data had been generated beforehand, but in this part of the 
lunar  phase  where  the  test  persons  observe  the  data  in  the  MMI 
experiments.  This was exactly what we had found. This observation 
might provide evidence of an ability of the human consciousness to 
influence targets distributed in space and time without being limited 
by the constraints of the local bodily presence (Schmidt, 1981).
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Abstract
The current  study explores  Wilson and French’s  (2006)  finding  
that  believers  in  the  paranormal  are  more  susceptible  to  false  
memories  than  non-believers.  Seventy  participants  completed  a  
News Coverage Questionnaire concerning personal memories about  
first seeing dramatic news events. The events included four news  
items that are known to have been captured on film and two items  
for which there is no known footage (the Princess Diana car crash  
and the Bali Bombing). Presentation order was found to affect the  
reporting  of  false  memories.  Endorsement  of  the  Diana  false  
memory item positively correlated with scores  on the Australian  
Sheep-Goat Scale and the Dissocative Experience Scale when the  
item appeared first but not when it appeared fifth. Believers in the  
paranormal  were  more  susceptible  to  false  memory  than  non-
believers  when  the  critical  item  was  answered  without  first  
recalling  actual  television  footage.  However,  recalling  previous  
news  footage  facilitated  endorsement  of  the  false  memory  item 
independent of paranormal belief and level of dissociativity.
Introduction
 
False  memory  has  frequently  been  investigated  using  the 
“crashing paradigm” (Crombag, Wagenaar, & van Koppen, 1996). This 
involves examining participants’ willingness to report memories of a 
highly emotional  and consequential  event  that  they  could  not  have 
witnessed (Crombag et al., 1996; Granhag, Strömwall, & Billings, 2003; 
Ost, Vrij, Costall, & Bull, 2002; Wilson & French, 2006). This approach 
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was pioneered by Crombag, et al. (1996) and is based on the notion that 
participants  will  be  influenced  by  a  critical  question,  which  falsely 
suggests that actual film footage exists (Crombag et al., 1996; Loftus, 
1975). 
Crombag et al. (1996) questioned participants 10 months after the 
crash  of  an  E1-A1  Boeing  747  into  a  block  of  flats  in  Amsterdam 
(October,  1992).  Although,  there was no actual  footage of  the plane 
crash the event received extensive media coverage. When asked, “Did 
you see the television film of the moment the plane hit the apartment 
building?”, 55% of the participants reported that they had seen non-
existent  footage.  In  addition  to  this,  82%  of  participants  provided 
details  about  a non-existent  fire.   In  a second study Crombag et  al. 
(1996)  replicated  these  results.  When  participants  were  asked  to 
provide highly specific details about the crash (e.g., the angle at which 
the plane  crashed into the building)  66% of  participants  claimed to 
have seen the footage and the majority were able to provide detailed 
responses to the questions.
Other  studies  testing  recollection  of  high  profile  events,  for 
which there is no known footage, have produced similar results:  the 
Diana, Princess of Wales, car crash (Ost, Vrij, Costall, & Bull, 2002); the 
sinking  of  the  Estonia  ferry,  in  which  almost  900  lives  were  lost 
(Granhag et al.,  2003); and the assassination of Dutch politician Pim 
Fortuyn (Jelicic, Smeets, Peters, Candel, Horselenberg, & Merckelbach, 
2006).  Each  of  these  studies  produced impressive  results.  Ost  et  al. 
(2002) using the Diana Princess of Wales car crash found that 44% of 
participants were willing to report that they had seen actual television 
footage  of  the  crash.  Granhag  et  al.  (2003)  noted  that  38%  of 
participants in study 1, and 55% in study 2, reported seeing footage of 
the sinking of the Estonia ferry. Jelicic et al. (2006) found that 63% of 
participants  claimed  to  have  seen  non-existent  footage  of  the 
assassination of Pim Fortuyn, although only 23% could provide details. 
It is evident from these studies that participants will frequently report 
having witnessed events they could not possibly have seen; events for 
which no known video footage exists.
Wilson  and  French  (2006)  using  a  modified  version  of  the 
crashing memories paradigm examined the relationship between false 
memory  and  paranormal  belief/experience.   They  contended  that 
research in this area was important because variables associated with 
susceptibility to false memories (e.g., dissociativity, fantasy proneness, 
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absorption)  had  also  been  found  to  correlate  with  paranormal 
belief/experience (Wilson and French, 2006).  
To  test  this,  Wilson  and  French  (2006)  asked  participants  to 
complete  a  News  Coverage  Questionnaire  (NCQ),  the  Australian 
Sheep–Goat Scale (ASGS) (Thalbourne, 1995), Dissociative Experiences 
Scale  (DES)  (Bernstein  &  Putnam,  1986),  and  the  Anomalous 
Experiences Inventory (Kumar, Pekala, & Gallagher, 1994). The NCQ 
contained four events that are known to have been captured on film 
(the  attack  on  the  World  Trade  Centre,  the  Hillsborough  football 
stadium disaster, the toppling of the Saddam Hussein statue in Basra, 
and the Challenger  space  shuttle  disaster)  and one  item concerning 
non-existent footage (the bombing of a nightclub in Bali). Participants 
were asked specific  questions  about  each of  the events  (where they 
were, who they were with, and where they saw the footage). Questions 
were also asked about the footage (e.g., was it in colour or black and 
white, was there a commentary, and what was the picture quality like). 
Wilson  and  French  (2006)  found  that  36%  of  respondents  falsely 
claimed  to  have  seen  footage  of  the  Bali  bombing.  Participants 
reporting false memories were found to score higher on the ASGS, the 
DES,  and  on  the  Belief,  Experience  and  Ability  subscales  of  the 
Anomalous  Experiences  Inventory  than  participants  who  did  not 
report seeing the non-existent footage. On the basis of their findings 
Wilson and French (2006) concluded that believers in the paranormal 
may be more susceptible to false memories than non-believers.  This 
assertion, whilst logical, has yet to be firmly established and will be 
examined within the current paper.
The present study
Whilst  Wilson  and  French  (2006)  found  support  for  the 
hypothesis that believers in the paranormal may be more susceptible to 
false  memories  than  non-believers,  other  studies  exploring  the 
relationship between susceptibility to false memories and the tendency 
to report  anomalous experiences have achieved only limited success 
(French,  2003;  French  &  Wilson,  2006).  French,  in  his  review  of 
eyewitness  testimony  and  false  memories  for  reports  of  anomalous 
experiences (French, 2003; Wilson & French, 2006), suggests that this 
may  be  because  studies  have  used  inappropriate  techniques  to 
measure  susceptibility  to  the  “type”  of  false  memories  expected  to 
correlate  with  the  tendency  to  report  anomalous  experiences. 
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Particularly,  French  suggests  that  techniques  attempting  to  produce 
detailed  false  memories  for  entire  episodes  (e.g.,  Loftus  &  Pickrell, 
1995)  may  be  more  successful  than  techniques  which  attempt  to 
produce  false  memories  for  individual  words  (e.g.,  Roediger  & 
McDermott,  1995;  word lists).  This notion was supported by Wilson 
and French’s (2006) findings with news events. 
The problem with  the Wilson  and French (2006)  study is  that 
endorsement of the false memory item may be conflated by the prior 
exposure of participants to news events for which footage exists. In the 
Wilson and French (2006) paper the critical Bali bombing event was 
presented  after  two  events  for  which  there  was  actual  footage. 
Presenting the critical scenario in this way may encourage participants 
to  make  reporting  errors.  Remembering  actual  footage  may  bias 
participants’ responses when faced with an event for which no footage 
exists; participants may assume the event was shown on television, or 
that their memory of the event was based on television coverage.  If 
participants are being influenced in this way, it  would be predicted 
that item order would affect the reporting of false memories.  Under 
conditions where participants are first  asked to recall  real  footage it 
seems plausible  that  they will  be  more likely  to misreport  recalling 
non-existent  news  footage.  Indeed,  Wilson  and  French  (2006) 
hypothesized that this  may be an important factor requiring further 
research.  Noting  that  the  level  of  false  memory  endorsement  was 
higher in their study than comparative studies (e.g., Jelicic et al., 2006), 
they speculated that this was because previous studies used a single 
event; Wilson and French (2006) presented the false memory amongst 
four  other  events  that  had been  filmed.  For  this  reason the  current 
study assesses  whether  recalling  footage  of  actual  events  influences 
participants’ false memory responses.
This  is  achieved  in  the  present  paper  by  manipulating  news 
event order.  The critical event will  be presented first  and last (fifth) 
within  an  adapted  version  of  the  NCQ.  The  story  selected  for  this 
purpose is  the fatal  Paris  car crash involving Diana,  the Princess  of 
Wales,  and her companion Dodi Fayed. This item has been used in 
other similar studies, where participants have been found to wrongly 
report seeing actual crash footage (Ost et al., 2002). This scenario was 
selected over the Bali bombing because it received extensive coverage 
and the story has remained in the news since the episode occurred. The 
Bali  bombing,  whilst  an  important  happening,  has  received  less 
prominent  coverage  since  the  event,  consequently,  it  was  felt  that 
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participants would be less familiar with the Bali bombing.  In order to 
allow  direct  comparison  with  Wilson  and  French  (2006),  the  Bali 
bombing will still be used in the current study; it is presented at the 
end  of  the  experiment  to  determine  if  levels  of  false  memory  are 
similar to those reported by Wilson and French.
Wilson and French (2006) hypothesized that item order would 
influence the reporting of false memory. In particular they claimed that 
recalling real news footage in preceding items would prime or activate 
a generic schema for news coverage. Once activated, this news schema 
influences the encoding and comprehension of non-existent news items 
and  leads  to  that  information  appearing  more  real.  Under  such 
conditions, the individual is more likely to erroneously assert that such 
footage actually existed. Thus it is predicted that presenting the Diana 
false memory item last rather than first will increase false memory item 
endorsement and that presenting the Bali bombing question at the end 
of the current study will result in a higher level of endorsement than 
that reported in the Wilson and French (2006) study. In addition to this 
the  present  study  will  assess  whether  item  order  affects  the 
relationship  between  paranormal  belief,  dissociative  experience  and 
false memory, In line with Wilson and French (2006) it is predicted that 
level  of  paranormal  belief  and  dissociative  experience  will  be 
associated  with  false  memory  endorsement  and  the  rating  of  false 
memory characteristics.  The major contribution of the present  study 
will be to assess whether the relationship between paranormal belief, 
dissociative experience and false memory is qualified by item order. 
Method
Participants
Seventy respondents  participated in this  study.  There were 25 
males and 45 females. The mean age was 30.63 years (SD = 12.51) with 
a  range  of  16–67  years.  Participants  included  undergraduates  and 
employees  from  the  Manchester  Metropolitan  University  and 
volunteers from the wider community.
Materials
Participants were asked to complete in the following order: an 
adapted version of the News Coverage Questionnaire (NCQ) (Wilson 
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& French, 2006); the Australian Sheep–Goat Scale (ASG) (Thalbourne, 
1995);  and  the  Dissociative  Experiences  Scale  (DES)  (Bernstein  & 
Putnam, 1986). Questionnaire order was the same for all participants. 
The News Coverage Questionnaire was designed by Wilson and 
French (2006). The questionnaire contains five news items;  four events 
that are known to have been captured on film (the 2001 attack on the 
World Trade Centre; the 1989 Hillsborough football stadium disaster; 
the 2003 toppling of the  Saddam Hussein statue in Basra; and the 1986 
Challenger  space  shuttle  disaster)  and  one  item  concerning  non-
existent footage (the 2002 Bali nightclub bombing). Participants were 
asked to indicate: whether they recall first seeing the event; where they 
saw the event; and who they were with at the time. Questions were 
asked about  the  actual  news item footage:  whether  the  clip  was  in 
colour or black and white; whether there was an audible commentary 
on the footage; and how participants would rate the picture quality. 
These questions  were intended to ensure that  participants  reporting 
false memories based their report upon a specific memory of viewing, 
rather  than  just  recalling  the  circumstances  under  which  they  first 
heard the news being reported. 
In  the  current  study  an  additional  item  was  added.  This 
concerned  watching  non-existent  footage  of  the  1997  car  crash 
involving Princess Diana. This item was selected because participants 
have been found to often report seeing the actual video footage of the 
crash in which Diana, Princess of Wales, and Dodi Fayed died, even 
though  no  footage  exists  (Ost  et  al.,  2002).  This  news  event  shares 
many important features with the El Al air crash used in Crombag et 
al.’s (1996) study: the media extensively covered the story; television 
footage appeared soon after the event; the crash was the main news 
story; the story was told again and again illustrating what footage was 
actually available; people knew many details about the event without 
actually seeing it; and a simulation of the event was shown on some 
news stations. 
In order to allow the current study to assess the effect of item 
order on false memory, the order of the items for which there is no 
known  television  footage  was  manipulated.  The  Diana  news  event 
appeared in either first or fifth; that was before or after the events for 
which there was known footage (World Trade Centre, Hillsborough, 
Space Shuttle Challenger and Basra). The second critical item, the Bali 
Bombing  was  presented  at  the  end  of  the  study  to  allow  direct 
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comparison with Wilson and French (2006). The NCQ was followed by 
the Australian Sheep–Goat Scale (ASG) and DES.
The Australian Sheep–Goat Scale (ASGS) measures belief in, and 
alleged experience of, the paranormal. It consists of 18 items that relate 
to  three  core  concepts  of  parapsychology:  life  after  death, 
psychokinesis, and extrasensory perception. The response options are: 
False (scored as zero), “?” (Don’t know: scored as 1 point), and True 
(scored  as  2  points).  The  scale  has  a  range  from zero  to  36,  higher 
scores indicating higher levels of belief and experience. The ASGS has 
proven  reliability  and  validity  (Thalbourne,  1995;  Thalbourne  and 
Delin, 1993).   
The Dissociative  Experiences  Scale  (DES;  Bernstein  & Putnam, 
1986) is a 28-item self-report  measure that assesses the frequency of 
dissociative  experiences  on  a  response  scale  that  starts  at  0%  and 
increases  by 10% increments  up to 100% (Carlson & Putnam, 1993). 
Responses across all items are averaged to obtain a mean DES score 
(range  0–100),  with  higher  scores  indicating  higher  levels  of 
dissociative symptoms. 
Procedure
Participants  were  informed  that  the  current  study  was 
investigating memory for  news events.  Following completion of  the 
questionnaire  participants  were  debriefed.  They were  informed that 
there was no actual footage of the Diana crash and the Bali bombing.
Results
Both  the  Australian  Sheep–Goat  Scale  (ASGS)  (α  =  .92)  and 
Dissociative  Experiences  Scale  (DES)  (α  =.90)  were  found  to  have 
excellent internal reliability. Of the 70 participants who completed the 
questionnaire, 68 (97%) reported that they had seen the video footage 
of the attack on the World Trade Centre, 26 (37%) reported having seen 
the video footage of the Hillsborough football disaster in 1989, 65 (93%) 
recalled  video  footage  of  the  statue  of  Saddam Hussein  being  torn 
down in Basra in 2003, and 22 (31%) recalled the video footage of the 
Challenger space shuttle disaster in 1986. Regarding the non-existent 
video footage, 57 (81%) participants claimed to have seen the car crash 
involving Princess Diana; endorsement was higher on this item than 
on  two  of  the  events  for  which  actual  video  footage  exists 
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(Hillsborough and the space shuttle Challenger). Table 1 contains the 
percentage claiming recall  for the present study and for Wilson and 
French (2006).
Table 1: Percentage Claiming to Recall Television Footage of Specific News Events in the Current 
Study and in the Wilson and French (2006) Study
Percentage claiming recall
News story Current study Wilson & French (2006)
World Trade Center 97 97
Hillsborough 37 30
Basra 93 72
Challenger 31 40
Bali 53 36
Diana 81 NA
To  determine  whether  endorsement  of  the  Diana  crash  (false 
memory  item)  was  influenced  by  scenario  presentation  order 
(presented first vs. fifth) chi-square was used. A significant association 
was  found  between  presentation  order  and  item endorsement,  χ2  = 
5.14, df = 1,  p  = .023,  Cohen’s  d = 0.56.  In particular,  77% of correct 
rejections occurred when the Diana event was presented first this fell 
to 23% when the event was presented fifth (last), χ2  = 3.77, df = 1, p = .
052,  Cohen’s  d =  0.54. Endorsement  of  the  Diana crash  was  further 
studied  by  examining  false  alarms,  the  number  of  incorrect 
endorsements  produced,  This  found that  presentation  order  had no 
significant effect on the number of false alarms produced, χ2  = 1.42, df 
=1. p > .05, Cohen’s d = 0.32; the trend towards fewer false alarms 42% 
when  presented  first,  compared  to  58%  when  presented  fifth  was, 
however,  in  the  predicted  direction.  Finally,  the  difference  between 
correct rejections and false alarms as a function of presentation order 
was analysed. True memory was found to be higher when the Diana 
crash was presented first than when it was presented fifth, χ2 = 5.82, df 
=1. p = .016, Cohen’s d = 0.78.
Of  the  57  participants  who claimed to  have  seen  non-existent 
footage of the Diana crash, 88% were willing to state where they were 
when they saw the footage, 71% recalled who they were with at the 
time, and 51% recalled what TV channel/website they saw the footage 
on (95% claiming it was in colour). The picture quality of the footage, 
on a 7-point scale was 5.12 (SD = 1.47) and the mean clarity of memory 
was 5.00 (SD = 1.82).
180
Dagnall, Parker & Munley
The  mean  clarity  rating  for  events  with  actual  footage  was 
compared with the mean rating for the Diana non-existent television 
footage. Participants who endorsed having seen the Diana footage (M = 
5.00) claimed to recall it as clearly as they did actual footage (M = 5.02); 
t (56) = - 0.09, p > .05.    
A median split was performed on ASGS scores to produce high 
(above  median)  and  low  (below  median)  conditions.  A  2  (Level  of 
Paranormal Belief:  high vs.  low) x 2 (Presentation Order:  first,  fifth) 
factor  between  subjects  ANOVA  was  then  conducted  to  determine 
whether variable level (high vs. low) and presentation order affected 
participants’ clarity ratings of the non-existent Diana car crash footage 
(see Table 2). 
Table 2: Clarity Ratings of the Non-Existent Diana Car Crash Footage as a Function of level of 
Paranormal Belief
Level of paranormal belief
Below Median Above Median Overall
Presentation order M SD M SD M SD
First 4.80 1.62 4.93 1.33 4.88 1.42
Fifth 3.86 2.18 6.00 1.49 5.09 2.08
Overall 4.25 1.94 5.55 1.50
A  significant  main  effect  was  noted  for  Level  of  Paranormal 
Belief,  F(1,  53)  =  6.24, p =  .016,  ηp2 =  0.11.  Participants  high  in 
paranormal belief (M = 5.55, SD = 1.50) rated the clarity of the non-
existent footage higher than participants low in paranormal belief (M = 
4.25, SD = 1.99).
No significant effect was found for Presentation Order, F(1, 53) 
= .20, p > .05. The interaction between Level of Paranormal Belief and 
Presentation Order, F(1, 53) = 4.91, p = .031, ηp2 = 0.09  was significant.
Simple main effect analysis on each level of Presentation Order 
showed that Level of Paranormal Belief had no effect on clarity rating 
when the Diana car crash question was presented first, t(22) = 0.21,  p 
> .05, however, it did affect ratings when the Diana car crash question 
was presented fifth. Participants high in paranormal belief (M = 6.00, 
SD = 1.48) were found to rate clarity for the non-existent footage higher 
than those low in paranormal belief (M = 3.86, SD = 2.18; t(31) = 3.36, p 
= .002, Cohen’s d = 1.21).
A median split was performed on DES scores to produce high 
(above  median)  and  low  (below  median)  conditions.  A  2  (Level  of 
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Dissociativity:  high  vs.  low)  x  2  (Presentation  Order:  first,  fifth) 
ANOVA was then conducted to determine whether DES score (high 
vs. low) and presentation order affected participants’ clarity ratings of 
the non-existent Diana crash footage (see Table 3).
Table 3: Clarity Ratings of the Non-Existent Diana Car Crash Footage 
as a Function of level of Dissociativity
Level of dissociativity
Below Median Above Median Overall
Presentation order M SD M SD M SD
First 5.18 1.66 4.61 1.19 4.88 1.42
Fifth 4.31 2.32 5.60 1.79 5.09 2.08
Overall 4.71 2.05 5.21 1.64
No significant main effect was found for Level of Dissociativity 
F(1,  53)  =  0.56, p >  .05.  No  significant  main  effect  was  noted  for 
Presentation Order,  F(1,  53)  =  0.13, p >  .05.  The interaction between 
Level of Dissociativity and Presentation Order F(1, 53) = 3.65, p > .05 
was not significant.
A  series  of  correlations  were  conducted  to  investigate  the 
relationship  between  Australian  Sheep–Goat  Scale  (ASGS)  and 
Dissociative  Experiences  Scale  (DES)  scores,  and  whether  or  not 
participants claimed to have seen television footage of the car crash 
involving Princess Diana. ASGS was found to positively correlate with 
participants’ endorsement of the non-existent Diana television footage 
(r = .38, n = 70,  p = .001). A significant correlation was found between 
ASGS and the clarity rating of the non existent Diana memory (r = .35, 
n  =  57,  p  =  .007).  DES  was  found  to  positively  correlate  with 
participants’ endorsement of the non-existent Diana television footage 
(r = .28, n = 70, p = .017). No significant relationship was found between 
DES and the clarity rating of the non existent Diana memory (r = .17, n 
= 57, p > .05). The DES and ASGS were also found to correlate (r = .37, n 
= 70, p = .002). 
Further correlations were conducted on participants’  responses 
when the Diana item was presented first and fifth. When the Diana 
item  appeared  first  positive  correlations  were  found  between  false 
memory endorsement and paranormal belief (r = .43, n = 34,  p = .011) 
and between false memory endorsement and DES (r = .39, n = 34, p = .
022). When the Diana item appeared fifth no significant relationship 
was found between false memory endorsement and paranormal belief 
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(r = .28, n = 36,  p > .05) and between false memory endorsement and 
DES (r = .16, n = 36, p > .05).
These results indicate a significant positive correlation between 
false memory and belief  in the paranormal and DES when the false 
memory  item  is  not  preceded  by  events  for  which  footage  exists. 
However, no relationship was found between false memory and belief 
in the paranormal and DES when the false memory item was presented 
after events for which there was known footage.
Endorsement  of  the  non-existent  Bali  bombing  footage  was 
presented  at  the  end  of  the  questionnaire  in  the  current  study  to 
investigate  whether  presentation  order  affected  the  proportion  of 
correct and incorrect responses. The data from this paper, where the 
event  was  presented  last  was  compared  with  that  of  Wilson  and 
French (2006); Wilson and French (2006) always presented the Bali item 
third of  five.  As predicted presenting the Bali  item last  produced a 
higher percentage of false endorsements (53% compared to 36% in the 
Wilson & French, 2006 study), χ2  = 4.77, df = 1, p = .029, Cohen’s  d = 
0.54. Endorsement of the Bali false memory item may have been higher 
in the current study than the French and Wilson (2006) study because 
participants  were  influenced  by  previously  recalling  actual  footage 
(World Trade Centre, Hillsborough, Basra, etc.)1. 
Discussion
Consistent  with  previous  studies  a  substantial  proportion  of 
participants erroneously reported seeing non-existent news footage of 
critical events (crash of Diana and Bali bombing) (Crombag et al.,1996; 
Granhag et  al.,  2003;  Ost  et  al.,  2002;  Smeets  et  al.,  2006;  Wilson & 
French, 2006). The current paper investigated the hypothesis that the 
reporting of false memories would be affected by presentation order as 
predicted by Wilson and French (2006). It was expected that a higher 
proportion of participants would report seeing the Diana crash when 
the  critical  question  was  presented  fifth  rather  than  first,  and  that 
presenting the Bali bombing question at the end of the current study 
would result in a higher level of endorsement than that reported in the 
Wilson  and  French  (2006)  study.  Both  of  these  predictions  were 
supported: 77% of correct rejections occurred when the Diana item was 
presented first; and higher levels of endorsement were produced for 
1 Whilst it is unusual to combine data in this way, studies in this area frequently use percentage 
comparisons to support/refute points (e.g., Smeets, et al., 2006; Wilson & French, 2006).
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the Bali  item than were found in the Wilson & French (2006) study 
(53% vs. 36%). 
The influence of serial order is explained by Wilson and French 
(2006) as due to the activation of a generic news schema. Presumably, 
once primed, the news schema provides a basis for the encoding and 
comprehension of incoming information. Non-existent footage is thus 
assimilated into this  schema. When probed about the details  of  this 
footage, the generic schema is reactivated and false memories of non-
existent  events  are  the  result.  Interestingly,  clarity  ratings  also 
increased when the critical item was presented fifth, at least for those 
high in paranormal belief. It would appear that these individuals had 
more vivid false recollections of the details of the non-existent event. 
Exactly  why  this  was  found  in  terms  of  the  news  schema 
hypothesis is difficult to say. Schematic information, by its very nature, 
is abstracted away from specific perceptual or episodic details that may 
influence ratings of clarity (Alba & Hasher, 1983). Indeed, memory for 
schematic  information  is  less likely  to  be  associated  with  clear  and 
vivid recollections  (Lampinen,  Faires,  Neuschatz,  & Toglia,  2000).  If 
this is true,  then the news schema hypothesis  of Wilson and French 
(2006)  may not  provide a full,  account  of  the effects  observed here. 
Instead,  perhaps  one  explanation  is  that  individuals  high  in 
paranormal  belief  are  more  prone  to  incorporating  perceptual  or 
episodic features form real events into their false memories. In other 
words, they are more likely to “import” details from studied events 
into non-studied events making them seem more likely and real (e.g., 
Lyle & Johnson, 2006). Another possibility is that they adopt a more 
liberal criterion for assessing the degree of clarity and detail retrieved. 
Both these ideas warrant further investigation.
Previous  research  has  also  found  that  those  score  high  on 
measures  of  paranormal  belief  also  demonstrate  reality  monitoring 
deficits  (Irwin,  2004).  As  false  memories  can  also  arise  when 
individuals fail to accurately engage in reality monitoring, then false 
recollections of the Diana crash may also be due to reality monitoring 
failures in those endorsing high levels of paranormal belief.  
The  results  of  the  current  study  indicate  that  participants  are 
more likely to wrongly report seeing television coverage of an event 
when the critical false memory item is preceded by events for which 
actual footage exists. This supports the notion that remembering actual 
footage  biases  participants’  responses;  participants  may  assume  the 
“critical event” was shown on TV, or that their memory of the event 
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was  based  on  television  coverage  (Wilson  &  French,  2006). 
Participants scoring above the median on the ASGS were found to rate 
the clarity of the non-existent Diana footage higher than those scoring 
below  the  median  on  the  ASGS  when  the  Diana  question  was 
presented fifth.  No difference was evident when the Diana question 
was presented first.
In  the  current  study  overall  endorsement  of  the  non-existent 
Diana television footage was higher than that reported by Ost et al. 
(2002);  81% vs.  44%.  This  may be  partially  explained by the  use  of 
Wilson and French’s (2006) multi-event paradigm, but may also be due 
to other factors: the continued news coverage since the event; recent 
refocusing  (Stevens  Inquiry,  2006);  and  the  forthcoming  tenth 
anniversary coverage (August 2007). This notion is consistent with the 
imagination inflation effect (Garry et al., 1996). Whereby, intense and 
sustained  media  coverage  is  likely  to  encourage  people  to  imagine 
details of an event and motivate the belief that footage has appeared on 
television. 
The overall clarity rating for false memory in the current study 
was moderately high similar to that produced by Wilson and French 
(2006) (5.00 compared to 4.25: on a 7-point scale). As in the Wilson and 
French (2006) study the lowest clarity ratings were produced for the 
Hillsborough and Challenger disasters. This is perhaps not surprising 
as these are the two oldest events. Interestingly, for participants who 
“wrongly”  recalled  seeing  the  Diana  crash  there  was  no  difference 
between their false memory clarity rating and that for the real events 
(5.00  vs.  5.02).  This  finding  is  in  line  with  previous  research  (e.g., 
Porter, Yuille, & Lehman, 1999) that has demonstrated that fabricated 
memories are sometimes rated as vivid and detailed as real memories 
(Smeets  et  al.,  2006).  In  addition  to  this,  a  high  proportion  of 
participants provided details to accompany their endorsement of the 
Diana item. 
In support of Wilson and French (2006), the current study found 
positive  correlations  between  endorsement  of  the  Diana  item  and 
scores  on the  Australian Sheep–Goat  Scale  (ASGS)  and Dissociative 
Experiences Scale (DES). These findings are consistent with previous 
studies, which have reported relationships between false memory and 
psychological correlates of paranormal belief (e.g., fantasy proneness: 
Irwin, 1990; hypnotic suggestibility: Kumar & Pekala, 2001; absorption: 
Irwin, 1985; dissociativity: Wolfradt, 1997) (French & Wilson, 2006). 
185
News Events, False Memory and Paranormal Belief
A major finding in the current study was that the relationship 
between false memory and scores on the AGS and DES was qualified 
by  item  order.  A  medium  positive  correlation  was  found  between 
belief  in  the  paranormal  (ASGS),  DES,  and  false  memory  for 
“spontaneous”  endorsement  of  the  Diana  false  memory  item. 
However,  this  relationship  was  weakened  when  endorsement  was 
induced by thinking about actual  television footage of  news events. 
The fact that endorsement of the false memory item was affected by the 
presentation of  preceding events,  for which there  is  known footage, 
suggests  that  recalling  actual  footage  influenced  responses  on  the 
critical Diana item independent of paranormal belief and dissociativity. 
This  finding  is  consistent  with  Smeets  et  al.  (2006),  who 
demonstrated  that  reporting  of  non-existent  footage  was  shaped by 
misleading  and/or  ambiguous  questions,  and  that  the  endorsement 
rate  of  footage  depends  on  the  way  in  which  participants  are 
questioned.  Further  to  this,  they  identified  the  suggestibility  of  the 
participant as being important (Smeets et al., 2006).  Similarly, studies 
have  demonstrated  that  verbal  suggestion  can  affect  participants’ 
perception of paranormal events, such as séances (Wiseman, Greening 
& Smith,  2003)  and key bending (Wiseman & Greening,  2005).  Like 
these previous studies the current study is limited by the fact that it 
fails to explain the relationship between false memory, paranormal and 
psychological  variables;  it  is  unclear  whether  the  questions  affect 
perception,  memory,  or  whether  participants  are  influenced  by 
demand characteristics (French & Wilson, 2006). 
The use of the crashing paradigm to assess false memory is not 
without criticism. The main problem being that it does not necessarily 
follow  that  participants  claiming  to  have  seen  non-existent  news 
footage  have  actually  created  false  memories  (Smeets,  Merckelbach, 
Horselenberg,  &  Jelicic,  2005).  Statement  endorsement  may  be 
influenced by myriad cognitive and social factors (Smeets et al., 2006): 
participants  may  provide  socially  desirable  answers;  they  may 
misinterpret the critical questions (refer to the aftermath rather than 
the actual  event);  use general  knowledge heuristics;  or make source 
monitoring  errors  rather  than  create  false  memories.  Subsequent 
studies  are  required  to  assess  the  reasons  for  false  memory 
endorsement. 
In  addition  to  this  the  current  multi-event  paradigm  has  the 
problem of being unable to ensure that memory for actual footage is 
accurate. This is not important to the degree that the current study is 
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exploring  whether  participants  endorse  having  seen  non-existent 
footage. However, the fact that memories for events for which there is 
known footage may be untrue does bring into question the validity of 
subjective ratings. One obvious way of overcoming this problem is to 
show participants a series of news clips and then after delay, ask them 
about the events alongside events for which there is no known footage. 
This  modification,  whilst  time  consuming  would  ensure  that 
participants had been exposed to the footage and that “true” memories 
had a clearly identifiable objective basis.
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Irreducible  mind:  Towards  a  psychology  for  the  21st century is  a 
radical book for an epoch of extreme neurological reductionism. The 
causes of behaviours,  personality and consciousness are increasingly 
sought in localised brain areas and genes, and pretty much nowhere 
else;  'there is nothing more,  no magic,  no additional  components  to 
account  for  every  thought,  each  perception  and  emotion,  all  our 
memories, our personality, fears, loves and curiosities. (O'Shea, 2008, p. 
12).' Accompanying this is a widespread attempt to erase views of the 
mind that are 'occult' or 'immeasurable' (Dennett, 1978; Rorty 1979).
The  authors  of  Irreducible  Mind  (henceforth  IM)  believe  that 
there is more than enough evidence to demonstrate that this dominant 
view is at best incomplete and at worst false. The central problem is the 
relation between the private subjective 'first person' inner world and 
the outer,  objective 'third person'  world of physiological  events and 
processes in the body and brain (p. xvii, E.F. Kelly).
A far more inclusive theory is also needed to accommodate the 
full range of human experiences,  which includes 'rogue phenomena' 
like psi effects, mind-body interaction, mystic experience and others. 
F.W.H. Myers sketched the foundations of such a theory over a century 
ago  in  his  Human  Personality  and  its  Survival  of  Bodily  Death (1902), 
which  is  included  on  an  accompanying  CD.  In  Human  Personality, 
Myers developed a theory of the 'Subliminal Self.'  This was the idea 
that:
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There  exists  a  more  comprehensive  consciousness…  from  which  the 
consciousness and faculty of earth-life are mere selections…. [N]o Self of 
which we can here have cognisance is in reality more than a fragment of a 
larger Self  – revealed in a fashion at once shifting and limited through an 
organism not so framed as to afford it full manifestation. (Myers, 1902, v2, 
pp12-15. Quoted in IM p.73)
Myers'  Subliminal  Mind  contained  the  potential  for  genius  as 
well as pathology and the emergence of what he termed 'supernormal 
phenomena'  – things  that  apparently  belonged to  a  more  advanced 
stage of evolution (Myers, 1885). In addition, he thought that the brain 
should be viewed as a 'filter' that limited consciousness rather than its 
producer.  Myers'  theory  is  therefore  strongly  dualistic.  Most 
contemporary  researchers  reject  any  form  of  dualism  out  of  hand 
(Dennett,  1991),  but  this  has resulted in the toleration of some very 
unsatisfactory models of mind (Searle, 1992).
IM in part presents the case for some kind of interactive dualism. 
It  begins  with  an overview of  contemporary  cognitive  neuroscience 
(Chapter 1) and the historical foundations of an alternative approach 
(chapter  2)  before  tackling  problems  of  the  mind's  influence  on  the 
body  (chapter  3),  memory  (chapter  4),  automatism  and  secondary 
centres of consciousness (chapter 5),  unusual  experiences near death 
(chapter  6),  genius  (chapter  7)  and  mystical  experience  (chapter  8). 
Chapter  9  is  a  re-assessment  of  Myers'  theory  and  an  attempt  to 
provide  a  sketch  of  an  'expanded  psychology'.  For  clarity,  the 
individual chapter reviews are subtitled.
Chapter 1: A view from the mainstream: contemporary cognitive 
neuroscience and consciousness debates. [E.F. Kelly].
This chapter provides a potted history of cognitive neuroscience 
over the twentieth century, starting with behaviourism and proceeding 
to  the  cognitive  revolution.  This  “can  be  characterized…  as  a 
movement  toward  progressively  less  unsatisfactory  analyses  of  the 
mind” (p. 2).
Behaviourism ignored the inner workings of the mind in favour 
of  observable  behaviour;  complex  behaviours  were  believed  to  be 
combinations of simpler stimulus-response reactions. The behaviourist 
programme gave way in the 1950s and 1960s to a family of positions 
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known  collectively  as  identity  theory.  Identity  theory  states  that 
associated mental and physical states are in some sense identical (Feigl, 
1958;  Putnam,  1967).  Putnam  (1967)  favoured  a  variety  of  identity 
theory  called  functionalism,  which  is  promoted  by  contemporary 
writers like Dennett (1991). Functionalism defines mental states not in 
terms of what they are made of, but what they do. Just as 'cutting tools' 
might be made of stone, metal or laser beams, so mental states might 
be realizable in either brains or computers provided they serve similar 
functions.
Computers were central  to the cognitive revolution because of 
the  idea  that  a  sophisticated  computer  or  Artifical  Intelligence  (AI) 
might  perform  cognitive  functions  comparable  to  that  of  people 
(Turing,  1950).  Some  philosophers  rejected  the  idea  that  a  digital 
computer could ever be conscious. Searle (1992, 1980) argued that since 
computation was just symbol shuffling, even a sophisticated program 
could never, for instance, understand language in the way humans do. 
However, Searle (1984) also advocates a form of 'biological naturalism' 
(brains  =  mind),  a  stance  Kelly  rejects. I  personally  find  Searle's 
arguments inconclusive, and they are of course regularly pilloried by 
writers of a more computationalist bent (e.g. Hofstader, 2007).
The  'second'  cognitive  revolution  involved  connectionism  and 
dynamic systems,  both of  which try  to  address  the inadequacies  of 
classical  AI.  These  newer  approaches  still  rely  on  simulation  on  a 
digital computer, with its ultimate limitations.
There  is  currently  significant  dissatisfaction  with  dominant 
theories  of  mind,  which  belies  the  triumphal  claims  of  writers  like 
Pinker (2004). Chomsky (1993), a pioneer of the cognitive revolution, 
complained that  it  was  premature  to  try  and reduce  psychology to 
present-day neurophysiology,  and others  have  made similar  noises. 
Despite the hype, there is a clear need to move beyond the mainstream 
to develop new mind-models.
Chapter 2: F.W.H Myers and the empirical study of the mind-body 
problem [E.W.Kelly]
George  Santayana's  comment  (1905)  about  those  who  forget 
history being doomed to repeat it is certainly true of psychology. Many 
of the current claims that the 'self,' 'free will,' 'qualia,' etc. are illusions 
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are actually just the latest versions of assertions made in the nineteenth 
century.
In  the  latter  half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  psychology  was 
transformed  from  a  branch  of  moral  philosophy  to  a  naturalistic 
science.  At  the  time,  mechanistic  determinism  –  the  notion  of  the 
Universe as machine that obeyed laws -- was the dominant paradigm 
in science. A result of this was the emergence of epiphenomenalism, 
the view that mind and free will  are illusions or at  best  secondary, 
ineffectual  by-products  of  the  physical,  mechanical  world.  The  idea 
that the mind might be a fundamental,  causal agent in the universe 
was  rejected  from  the  start  because  this  was  seen  as  a  primitive, 
'supernatural' way of thinking.
However, this rejection had a cost, which was a conflict between 
experience and knowledge. Individual first-person experience suggests 
one kind of world of personal agency (free will, volition), but science 
suggested another kind of world, that of impersonal agency only. This 
conflict  led to a dilemma; either psychology should be expanded to 
include subjective agency, or else they could narrow psychology to fit 
science  as  it  was  then understood.  Historically,  the  mainstream has 
chosen the latter course.
Myers remained committed to the idea that the mind might be a 
fundamental  causal  agent.  This  alone  was  unpalatable  to  many 
contemporary scientists, and would be even more so today. However, 
Myers had many important insights into the nature of consciousness, 
which are based on many, many case studies. In many ways, he was 
the Darwin of psychology, in that he was able to organise and classify 
many different but overlapping phenomena into a coherent whole. The 
latter  half  of  this  important  chapter  gives  an  overview  of  this 
classification.
Chapter 3: Psychophysiological influence [E.W.Kelly]
The influence of the mind on the body's health, or otherwise, is 
one  of  the  great  unknowns  of  medicine.  This  has  been  denied,  of 
course; the currently prevailing view is that 'the mind-body problem…
cannot  be  viewed  as  the  subject  matter  of  psychosomatic  medicine 
(Lipowski, 1984)! However, there are a wide range of phenomena that 
beg important questions about the relationship between the body and 
the  mind.  'Psychophysiological  influence'  refers  to  a  large  range  of 
192
Colborn
phenomena,  from the relatively  conventional  'placebo  effects'  to  the 
hypnotic induction of wounds and marks on the skin (Moody, 1946, 
1948), to very odd cases where previous lives seem to have left their 
mark on the claimant's body (Stevenson, 1997).
The assessment of even relatively conventional phenomena like 
the placebo effect is not easy. Collins and Pinch (2005) describe placebo 
research  as  a  'hall  of  mirrors,'  plagued with  expectancy  effects  and 
reporting  biases.  Similar  problems  emerge  all  over  this  field.  One 
running theme is that phenomena tend to get ignored until someone 
conceives of a (conventional) mechanism to explain them. An example 
of this is the curing of warts by suggestion, which is a relatively well-
attested occurrence. Most of the theories have proposed the alteration 
of the blood-supply to the warts. Kelly argues that these explanations 
must  be  incomplete  because  some  cases  involve,  for  example,  the 
selective reduction of warts.
As an outsider to these fields, I find it very difficult to assess just 
how  well  established  many  of  these  phenomena  really  are.  For 
example,  Buckman  (2007)  claimed  that  there  was  little  persistent 
evidence that mental attitude affected the course of cancer. Kelly cites 
several small studies by Meares (1977, 1979,1980) that seem to show 
that  some  cancer  patients  did  benefit  from  an  intensive  course  of 
meditation – including five that had a complete remission. However 
Coyne, Stefanek & Palmer (2007) recently published a study on head 
cancer in which they claimed that psychotherapy had no effect. Emily 
Kelly (personal communication) responded that there are many factors 
involved, and ones that are not likely to be reproduced easily in studies 
like Coyne, Stefanek & Palmer.
Despite these issues,  if  even only a small  fraction of the cases 
cited by Kelly are legitimate, then they show that our understanding of 
the interrelationship between the mind and the body is not complete. 
So although this field has problems, it is a very rich one that deserves 
far more study than it gets.
Chapter 4: Memory [A.Gauld]
Alan Gauld's discussion of memory and the brain covers firstly 
problems with what he refers to as the 'memory trace doctrine'  and 
secondly, issues relating to memory and the question of Survival of 
bodily death.
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There  are  several  serious  problems  with  the  idea  that  our  memories  are 
stored as physical 'traces' in the brain. William James' noted that the simple 
revival of an image into the mind is not enough to make it a memory. Such an 
image is 'a duplicate, a second event, having absolutely no connection with 
the first event except that it happens to resemble it….' (James, 1890, pp 649—
50, cited in IM p.243).
Many explanations of the revival of a past memory presuppose 
its  function  and  cannot  really  explain  memory  itself.  Other  issues 
include  the  richness  and  form  of  associations  with  a  particular 
memory,  the  literal  nature  or  otherwise  of  'mental  images'  and  the 
feeling of past-directness of personal memories. The latter dilemma is 
connected to the problem of intentional recall,  and general issues of 
Intentionally.  These  issues  are  difficult,  but  Gauld's  prose  is  precise 
and deserves careful attention.
Contemporary  research  into  memory  tends  to  be  technically 
sophisticated but philosophically naïve. The Computational Theory of 
Mind  (CTM)  assumes  that  memory  works  in  a  way  somewhat 
comparable  to  the  information  processing  of  computers.  Many 
psychologists  still  discuss  memory  in  terms  of  'input'  'encoded'  by 
successive stages of sensory pathways and later 'retrieved' and further 
processed.  (Gauld  regards  neural  network  and  dynamic  systems 
models  of  memory  as  on  the  same footing  as  conventional  digital-
computer models in that their discrete internal memory states are still 
representations of a kind). Many of the conceptual issues remain.
Contemporary  neuroscience  is  currently  dominated  by 
NeuroImaging  techniques  like  PET  and  fMRI  scans.  Rather  than 
providing  clear  answers  to  issues  of  memory,  fMRI  studies  have 
produced rich cohorts of new data, much complexity and many new 
questions.  These  studies  are  also  fraught  with  conceptual  and 
methodological  problems  including  poor  to  nonexistent  replication 
(Harpaz, 1997). Gauld also notes that the early studies in particular led 
to some 'breathtaking oversimplifications;' like claims of the 'God spot' 
or 'seat of intelligence (p.267).'
Gauld concludes that many of these difficulties suggests that 'a 
fuller understanding of human memory may ultimately require some 
radical change of perspective.' (p. 281), especially if we take account of 
the evidence for the survival of memories beyond death. Any theory 
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will  be  need  to  be“top  down”  rather  than  “bottom  up,”  will 
accommodate the fact that some declarative memories cannot be tied to 
localities in the brain, and will regard nerve tracts not as conveyers of 
information but as 'means by which spatiotemporal patterns of activity 
in different regions may be fine-tuned to create overarching patterns 
(p.  228).'  Each  of  these  points  seems  pretty  reasonable  to  me,  and 
would begin address the naiveté of much current memory research.
Chapter 5: Automatism and secondary centres of consciousness 
[Adam Crabtree]
'Automatism' refers to the occurrence in some people of 'a set of 
memories, thoughts and feelings which are extra-marginal and outside 
of the primary consciousness altogether (James 1902/1958. P. 188, cited 
in IM, p.302).  Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID, formerly known as 
Multiple  Personality  Disorder),  where  a  number  of  distinct 
personalities appear to coexist within one person, is probably the most 
familiar  of  these  conditions,  but  there  are  a  whole  spectrum  of 
'dissociative' phenomena that can also be classed as automatisms. 
These were crucial for the development of Myers' theory of the 
'subliminal  mind,'  and  he  thought  that  the  explanation  for 
automatisms  needed  to  be  psychological  rather  than  physiological. 
This was partly because  the 'secondary centres  of  consciousness,'  of 
which  the  subject  was  apparently  not  consciously  aware,  often 
appeared to exhibit high levels of volition and intelligence. Examples 
are the messages sent by 'communicators' through automatic writing 
and also that some 'secondary personalities' of DID suffers can appear 
more intelligent and mature than their primary personalities.
The  chapter  goes  on  to  discuss  a  number  of  other  historical 
theories that were held before the subject of automatisms was, like so 
many other psychological  phenomena,  pushed into obscurity by the 
rise of behaviourism. It's  somewhat disheartening to read that more 
recent  theorists  like  Kihlstrom (1993)  seem only  just  to  be  reaching 
conclusions that were reached by James and Myers a century ago.
Volition  sits  at  the  heart  of  the  contemporary  debates  on 
automatisms,  and  these  phenomena  have  been  used  to  assert  that 
volition or free will  is  an illusion.  Wegner (2002) rejects entirely the 
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idea that human beings are free agents, claiming that all behaviour is 
involuntary. In his view, conscious will is simply an illusion.
In  this  interpretation,  automatisms are  simply  behaviours  that 
occur without the illusory feeling that it's produced by conscious will. 
Kelly observes that this ignores the close association of automatisms 
with supernormal phenomena, creativity and genius. I'm not sure how 
far  this  omission is  relevant  to  the volition issue;  one  could just  as 
easily argue that  works of  genius or supernormal  perception are as 
involuntary  as  the  products  of  pathology.  However,  it  is  another 
example of how researchers tend to cherry pick phenomena that serve 
their  theoretical  agendas,  and  ignore  pieces  that  may  prove 
inconvenient.
The  conflicting  views  on  automatisms  are  interesting  because 
they reveal the ambiguities in much of the data, and how this can be 
used  to  serve  several  contrasting  worldviews.  It's  also  sobering  to 
know how little progress has been made in this field the last century 
because of scientific prejudice.
Chapter 6: Unusual experiences near death and related phenomena 
[E.W. Kelly, B. Greyson & E.F. Kelly]
Chapter 6 primarily concerns Near Death Experiences, but also 
covers  Out  of  Body  Experiences,  Death  Bed  Visions,  Veridical  and 
Collective  Apparitions.  Much  of  what's  covered  will  be  familiar  to 
those  who've  followed  NDE  debates  over  the  years.  The  basic 
phenomenology  of  NDEs  is  described,  and  conventional 
neurophysiological explanations considered. The authors conclude that 
whilst each of these explanations has some merit, none can explain the 
NDE as a whole. 
The authors then consider those aspects of the NDE that seem to 
defy  conventional  models.  These  include  enhanced  mentation, 
veridical  Out-of-Body  perceptions  and  visions  of  deceased 
acquaintances.  Enhanced  mentation  refers  to  the  report  that  'full-
fledged mentation, either normal or even enhanced mental activity (p. 
386)'  occurs  when according to conventional  theory,  mental  activity 
should be receding. The writers acknowledge the difficulty of assessing 
such subjective reports, but are impressed by their frequency. Veridical 
OBE perceptions refer to the experiencer seeing or hearing things that 
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they  should  have  been  inaccessible  during  the  period  of 
unconsciousness.
Veridical impressions are also hard to verify, first because well-
attested  cases  are  admittedly  rare,  or  according  to  some  authors, 
probably non-existent (Blackmore, 1993). Second, it's hard to eliminate 
the  possibility  that  unconscious  person  might  have  seen  or  heard 
something  that  was  later  incorporated  into  the  NDE  account,  that 
unwittingly lends it veridicality (Blackmore, 1993). 
However, there are some aspects of some NDEs that do suggest 
something strange is going on. Firstly, a number of researchers have 
found  that  the  memory  of  events  happening  just  before  or  after 
consciousness loss are often confused or absent, which contrasts with 
the 'enhanced mentation' reports mentioned above. Second, there are 
rare cases where events were recalled that were occurring when the 
experiencer's  EEG  readings  were  flat.  This  is  potentially  very 
problematic  for  conventional  neuroscience  theories  of  a  'global 
workspace' because such theories say that normal mental functioning 
requires synchronous EEG oscillations in the brain. Thinking seems to 
be happening when these theories say it is impossible.
NDE research suffers because it's  often popularly  framed as a 
dispute between those who 'believe' in the afterlife interpretation and 
those who think that conventional scientific explanations are sufficient 
(Kellehear, 1995). This is unfortunate, because such polarized thinking 
might very well mask genuine anomalies that point to unknown mind/
brain functions. However, more and better well-attested cases are still 
needed, even if they are rare and difficult to find.
Chapter 7: Genius [E.F. Kelly & M. Grosso]
In many senses the products of genius are the most problematic 
for mainstream psychology, because they are poorly understood but 
relied upon for scientific  breakthroughs.  Myers'  view of genius was 
that it 'should be regarded as a power of utilizing a wider range than 
other men can utilize of faculties…innate in all…. (Human Personality. 
Vol.  1,  p.  71).'  He  spoke  of  a  'Subliminal  uprush,'  that  is  the 
manifestation of strength and concentration of some inward unifying 
control  into  the  conscious  mind.  This  'uprush'  is  often  achieved 
through various forms of automatism and even hallucination.
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This view is compatible with Hutchinson's (1939) description of 
the  stages  of  creativity  (preparation,  incubation,  illumination  and 
verification). However, there is a modern school that that sees genius 
as an incremental application of ordinary consciousness and denies it's 
quantitatively different at all (Weisberg, 1999; Perkins, 2000). Kelly and 
Grosso rightly comment that this is an especially egregious example of 
a  willful  disregard  of  evidence  that  creativity  is  actually  a  very 
mysterious  and  complex  phenomenon.  The  incommensurability  of 
creative  thought  with  conscious,  logical  thought  is  an  important 
example of where computational models fall down in describing the 
creative process. Myers was right to highlight that many of the creative 
aspects of genius lie beyond speech, in an almost mystical realm. The 
authors also highlight the limits of associationism and neural network 
views in this respect.
Kelly  &  Grosso  are  also  right  to  raise  the  idea  that  genius  is 
somehow  a  personality  in  transformation,  with  strong  links  to  the 
mystical.  They summarise four areas  in which progress  needs to be 
made. Firstly as with other topics, an expansion of current psychology 
to accommodate data is needed, second is to address the problem of 
intentionality, third is to focus on the transformative nature of genius 
and lastly recognition of the links between mysticism and genius. 
Chapter 8: Mystical Experience [E.F. Kelly & M. Grosso].
This chapter is in some ways the heart of the book, because it 
describes  experiences  that  on  occasion  seem  to  show  that  'pure, 
unitary, undifferentiated, self-reflexive consciousness' can exist (p.573). 
This prima facie contradicts functionalist and computationalist theories 
of  the  human  mind  because  it  suggests  that  consciousness  has  a 
'central and even supreme reality' over and above function.
The  authors  begin  by  providing  an  overview  of  the 
phenomenology of mystical experience. These include ineffability (that 
these experiences describe expression), that they seem to be in some 
sense states of non or trans-verbal knowledge or insight, that they are 
intense and not often sustained and that the experiences often exhibit 
certitude as to its importance. To quote James (1902), p. 321); 'In mystic 
states we both become one with the absolute and we become aware of 
our oneness.'
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A  key  point  is  whether  persons  who  have  had  one  or  more 
mystical  experiences  are  really  talking  about  the  same  thing,  or 
whether  they are  really talking about  distinct  experiences  that  have 
been moulded by their own cultures and only afterwards interpreted 
as being similar. Constructivists such as Katz (1978) argued that since 
any experience  is  filtered by culture,  one cannot  really talk about  a 
common state  of  consciousness  found across  all  cultures.  However, 
separate mystical traditions in very different seem to be very similar 
and constructivism cannot account for the commonality in the reports. 
The problem of 'objective significance,' remains. The authors list 
several circumstantial arguments that mystics do, in fact, make contact 
with reality in novel ways. There is the persistent connection between 
mystical  experience  and  genius.  There  are  its  connections  with 
automatism, also associated with creativity and genius. There are the 
apparent  connections  with  supernormal  phenomena.  But  while 
certainly  suggestive,  none  of  these  features  provide  direct  evidence 
that  mystical  states  are  anything other  than a  novel  function of  the 
brain.
However, current neurobiological theories of mystical states are 
not very good. The authors note that researchers commonly (1) fail to 
come  to  grips  with  the  full-blown  phenomenology  of  the  mystical 
experience,  (2)  often  have  very  poor  supporting  data  and  (3)  are 
excessively willing to spin out elaborate neurobiological just-so stories.
A case in point is the claimed association between mystical states and 
Temporal Lobe Epilepsy (Saver & Rabin, 1997), for which the authors 
report 'no credible evidence (p. 534).'
The latter part of the chapter concern the induction of mystical 
experiences  by  drugs,  including  LSD  and  Ketamine.  Again,  the 
associations of these states with other anomalous experiences like NDE 
have  been  exaggerated,  but  there's  enough  common  ground  to  see 
these  experiences  as  related  but  not  identical.  The  authors  also 
comment on opportunities for further research, which are hampered 
by the current legal restrictions on drugs. An important problem with 
the assessment of mystical states is that mainstream neuroscience still 
regards  introspection  as  a  dangerous  way  to  gather  evidence, 
especially for non-ordinary states of consciousness. It's all too easy to 
dismiss these accounts as not really showing what they purport they 
show.  However,  the  study of  such  experiences  is  important  if  only 
because it forces us to confront an important dilemma for psychology, 
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which is; how do we make an objective science of something that can 
only be directly accessed by subjective means?
Chapter 9: Toward a psychology for the 21st Century [E.F. Kelly]
The final chapter begins with a reassessment of Myers'  theory 
and assesses  its implications for future psychology.  It  begins with a 
brief  look  at  contemporary  (1900s)  reviews  of  Human  Personality, 
which included concerns with the definition of 'Subliminal Mind' and 
with the inclusion of 'rogue phenomena.'
Several  issues  already covered  are  also  raised,  notably  Myers' 
awareness  that  psychology  must  be  expanded  to  accommodate 
territory  previously  held  to  belong  to  religion  or  metaphysics. 
Especially important is Myers' plea for a flexible approach to research, 
and the need to adapt research methods to new situations rather than 
trying to fit new problems into existing methods.
Kelly concludes that the current status of Myers' Subliminal self 
is  somewhat  mixed.  He  thinks  that  the  conception  remains 
counterintuitive  and  logically  difficult,  and  that  the  supporting 
evidence is 'less than compelling.' (p.594). However, Kelly regards it as 
'definitely possible and perhaps even probable, especially in the light 
of…mystical experiences' (p.595) that some sort of transmission theory 
is correct. If this is so, then Survival after death, Myers' central concern, 
becomes at least a possibility.
Can  this  view  of  the  human  psyche  be  reconciled  with 
contemporary  science?  One of  the  strengths  of  the  theory  is  that  it 
connects,  albeit  in  general  terms,  both  'normal'  and  'supernormal' 
phenomena. For example, it makes explicit the connection between psi 
phenomena  and dreaming,  genius  and mysticism.  Kelly  also  claims 
that  the  theory  has  some  predictive  value;  Myers  seems  to  have 
anticipated NDEs, and his concept of a 'permeable' boundary between 
the  subliminal  and  normal  consciousness  predates  the  work  of 
Thalbourne (1998) and Hartmann (1991) by a century.
The  authors  of  IM  believe  that  the  evidence  they  present  is 
'sufficient  to  falsify  all  forms  of  biological  naturalism,  the  current 
physicalist  consensus  on  mind-brain  relations.  'The  mind  is 
“irreducible”…. There is at least a fundamental bifurcation in nature 
that cannot be accounted for in [conventional physicalist terms] and we 
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seem  driven  toward  some  sort  of  animist  or  pluralist  alternative.' 
(p.605).
Despite the cohorts of data presented, I remain uneasy with this 
conclusion,  for  both  evidential  and  conceptual  reasons.  First,  even 
allowing  for  the  length  of  the  book,  there  are  some  significant 
omissions  in  the  evidence.  The  relative  neglect  of  experimental 
parapsychological research is strange given that the authors think that 
it's  crucial  in  their  arguments.  In  fairness,  the  psi  debates  are 
referenced  in  an  annotated  bibliography  of  psychical  research,  but 
more  discussion  of  the  results,  and  their  interpretation  in  terms  of 
Myers' Subliminal Mind would have helped.
One  consequence  of  making  the  data  from psychical  research 
central  to  the  arguments  for  the  mind  being  'irreducible'  is  the 
importation of a number of practical and conceptual  problems from 
that field. Reading IM, one is sometimes left with the impression that 
these 'rogue phenomena' are accessible to anyone who has eyes to see. 
This is certainly not the case with psi results, which are often weak, 
intermittent  and  context  dependent  (Hansen,  2001).  Experimenter 
effects  are  rampant  in  this  field,  and  'decline  effects'  may  also  be 
significant  (Colborn,  2007).  The  reports  of  many  of  the  more  outré 
phenomena like 'maternal impressions' are remote in time and space, 
and  might  also  be  declining  (Stevenson,  1997).  Any  model  of  an 
alternate picture of mind must convincingly accommodate these issues, 
and it's not clear that this has been done.
There are also sociological problems to bridge. One needs also to 
acknowledge that academe plays an active part in what Weber termed 
'the disenchantment of the world' (Hansen, 2001). This concept shows 
that the erasure of any magical notion of the mind is and probably will 
remain,  central  to  any  future  mainstream  psychology.  Many  of  the 
phenomena  presented  in  IM  (Stigmata,  Reincarnation,  Mystical 
experience)  are just  too closely associated with religious or mystical 
views  of  the  world  to  ever  really  be  part  of  the  rational  academic 
universe.
Another problem is data ambiguity. Anyone carefully reviewing 
the data of psychical research will find that quite often the data can be 
made  to  cut  both  ways  (Bauer,  2001;  Collins  &  Pinch,  1982),  as 
advocates and counter-advocates interpret the same data in different 
ways  according to  their  a  priori  expectations.  This  issue  is  not  just 
salient to the existence or otherwise of a phenomenon; quite often we 
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cannot  be  sure  whether  the  data  really  points  to  dualism  or  not. 
Laboratory  psi  phenomena  might  well  indicate  that  some  form  of 
dualism is necessary,  but  then again they might not.  Godbey (1978) 
argued fairly  coherently  that  psi  was  not  incompatible  with  central 
state  materialism.  It  is  quite  possible  to  build  a  coherent  case  for 
dualism, and a coherent case against, using much of the same data.
Differences in interpretation often arise because of a difference in 
a  priori  expectations  about  the  world,  and  many  of  these  are  not 
directly  testable.  Metaphysics  is  the  'elephant  in  the  room'  of 
consciousness  studies.  As  Midgley  (2001)  points  out,  many  current 
discussions about consciousness are really about clashing metaphysics. 
This  denial  of  metaphysics  is  also  evident  in  IM.  Whilst  the 
authors  (I  believe  correctly)  reject  the  simplistic  assumptions  of  the 
mainstream,  they  fail  to  make  sufficiently  explicit  that  often  the 
argument  is  not  over  empirical  evidence  but  over  ideological  and 
metaphysical  difference.  This  is  not  to  deny  that  the  cumulative 
evidence presented points to a far richer, more complex and interesting 
model of mind than is currently advocated by the mainstream. But the 
central  issue  of  subjective  experience  (as  outlined  on  pp.  24—29) 
remains  relatively  untouched,  and perhaps  untouchable  (see  Nagel, 
1974).
Finally,  the  authors  examine  two  alternative  models  of  mind, 
which they consider congruent with the evidence presented. The first 
is  a  non-Cartesian  dualist-interactionist  model,  and  the  second  a 
neutral-monist  model.  I  remain  suspicious  of  dualist  models  for 
reasons that have nothing to do with the 'denial' of rogue phenomena. 
Dualism was not only abandoned because of prejudice; the Cartesian 
split  was quite artificial  and arbitrary,  introduced because Descartes 
was too honest to ignore the strangeness of the subjective viewpoint, 
but  also  unable  to  relate  it  to  the  mechanistic  worldview  he  was 
developing (Midgley, 2001). My own take is that dualism is in many 
respects an 'observer effect' of the mind looking at itself and to take it 
too literally is like looking in the mirror and mistaking the reflection 
for a second person. In my view, it's fatal to lose sight of its artificial 
nature. For this (metaphysical?) reason, I find the Kelly's suggestion of 
a neutral-monist model of mind preferable to a return to a 'substance-
dualist'  solution. As they rightly state, since quantum theory, 'mind' 
and 'matter'  have  been  redefined out  of  existence;  neither  are  quite 
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what we thought they were. Maybe 'promissory materialism' will also 
eventually redefine itself out of existence.
The work of Henry Stapp (2005) seems especially promising here, 
which  seems  to  answer  many  of  the  criticisms  of  earlier  Quantum 
models and provide testable hypotheses of psychological phenomena 
like  attention.  Stapp provides  strong  arguments  to  suggest  that  the 
behaviour of low level brain constituents are saturated with quantum 
effects, which puts the burden of proof on those who deny, not affirm 
the relevance of quantum theory to brain science. These developments 
do not mean the gap between theory and psychical research has been 
fully bridged. Even physicists sympathetic to psi phenomena think that 
current  physics  would  need to  be  expanded  to  accommodate  them 
(Carr,  2008).  This gap between theory and evidence is an important 
obstacle to their case (Stent, 1972).
Despite these weaknesses, IM is an important work for a number 
of  reasons.  Firstly,  it  rehabilitates  the writings of  Myers,  which has 
languished in  obscurity  for  far  too  long.  Second,  it  places  'psi'  and 
other 'rogue' phenomena in a wider psychological context, suggesting 
ways  that  such  findings  might  be  integrated  with  mainstream 
knowledge.  Third,  it  provides  a  careful,  thorough  and  systematic 
critique of the weaknesses of mainstream claims. Fourth, it lays bear 
the extent of the denial of pretty much every interesting psychological 
phenomenon  by  mainstream  science,  mostly  in  the  name  of 
demystification.  For  these  reasons,  it's  a  key  work  for 
parapsychologists, and deserves also to be widely read by mainstream 
cognitive scientists.
Publication  Details: Kelly,  E.F.,  Kelly,  E.W.,  Crabtree,  A.,  Gauld,  A.,  
Grosso, M. & Greyson, B. (2007) Irreducible Mind: Toward a psychology for  
the  21st century.  Rowman  and  Littlefield.  800  pp.  ISBN-13:  
978-0-7425-4792-6,  ISBN-10:  0-7425-4792-2.  Publication  price:  $79.95  
(Cloth).
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